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SL’s seesaw battle with idealism and pragmatism

SL’s seesaw battle with idealism and pragmatism

26 Oct 2025 | By Dinouk Colombage


By the middle of the 20th century, Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) had started making inroads on the international stage, placing itself at the altar of recognition as an emerging middle power among the post-colonial states. 

Having announced itself by hosting the Colombo Powers Conference in 1954, followed by driving the agenda at the Bandung Conference in 1955, Sri Lanka was now embarking upon a more formalised role in the international structure by participating in the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Built upon the principles of the Bandung Conference, which had been first espoused by the Colombo Powers Conference, NAM developed a prescribed structure for 20th century post-colonial states. 

Among the founding members was Sri Lanka, who, alongside 25 other member states, met in Belgrade in 1961 to formally create an organisation that would enable countries to avoid being forced into siding with either the United States of America or the Soviet Union in the ongoing Cold War. 

Speaking at the inaugural session of NAM, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike stated: “Our endeavour should be to influence world opinion to such an extent that governments, however powerful, cannot regard warfare as an alternative to negotiation.” 

In keeping with the ideals first mooted at the Bandung Conference by Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala six years earlier, Sri Lanka was once again making it clear that mediation and negotiation was the pathway for global politics. 


Struggles within NAM


As tensions grew around the world, with many spilling over into open conflict such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba and the Vietnam War, NAM found itself struggling to maintain unity within its own bloc. While the organisation was vociferous in its condemnation of the Vietnam War and continued imperialism, divisions were emerging within the group. 

Support for the Vietnamese people’s right to self-determination and the sovereignty of Vietnam had to be balanced with the organisation’s commitment to non-interference in matters it considered internal issues. 

While Sri Lanka opposed US involvement in Vietnam, the Government of the time established ties with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam before establishing diplomatic relations with the reunified Vietnam. 

However, founder members such as Cuba discarded the core principles of neutrality and openly supported the North Vietnamese forces in the war against the US. This was an indication that despite NAM being built on the principles of non-interference, it came into conflict with the principle of opposition to colonialism and the support for self-determination.  

As these obstacles towards the principles of non-interference and neutrality grew in significance, many of the founder NAM members, including Sri Lanka, were forced to take up a more pragmatic approach towards foreign relations and geopolitics. 


A diplomatic high point  


As the country continued to drive forward on the international stage, it dawned on domestic policymakers that a proactive effort to ensure stability in the region was required on their part. In 1962, Sri Lanka played a significant role on the world stage as it attempted to mediate a cessation of hostilities in the Sino-India border conflict. 

Leveraging its position as a founding member of NAM committed to neutrality, coupled with the close relations maintained between Sri Lanka and both China and India, the Government led a six-nation (Myanmar, Cambodia, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka) mediation effort known as the ‘Colombo Proposals.’ 

While this did not ultimately resolve the border crisis, the acceptance in principle by both warring states of the proposals demonstrated the high regard which Sri Lanka was held in. Furthermore, it was the dynamic foreign policy efforts by Sri Lanka that limited any expansion of the conflict, thereby further cementing the practicality of the NAM principles of peaceful conflict resolution. 

For Sri Lanka, this was a diplomatic high point, demonstrating the country’s standing on the international stage and its ability to mediate international conflicts. Yet the war between China and India was also a pullback to reality for Sri Lanka. 


A more partisan role 


Despite India being a founding member of NAM, the organisation’s key principles of peaceful conflict resolution and sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations were under threat as India found itself in conflict with its own neighbouring states. 

Despite the proposed adherence to neutrality in the Cold War, during the Sino-Indian border conflict India found itself unofficially seeking out support from the Soviet Union in the form of both military and diplomatic means. 

With the domestic populace increasingly concerned about the growing influence of India in the South Asian region, the Sri Lankan Government took the decision to play a more partisan role when deemed necessary in international affairs. This marked a shift away from the country’s previous adherence to neutrality and peaceful resolution of conflicts. 

In 1971, nine years after attempting to mediate a peaceful resolution to the Sino-Indian conflict, the Sri Lankan Government openly supported Pakistan in the East Pakistan war. With India providing military support to the Mukti Bahini (Bangladesh’s independence fighters) in East Pakistan, Sri Lanka opened its airspace to Pakistani military aircraft, allowing them to refuel in Colombo before proceeding to East Pakistan. 

While the US supported Pakistan’s efforts to ensure that East Pakistan remained unified, the Soviet Union supported India’s effort in East Pakistan as an attempt to counter the US’s involvement. The Cold War had well and truly arrived in the South Asian region and Sri Lanka found itself taking sides. In an attempt to counter what was perceived as growing interference by India, the Sri Lankan Government believed a unified Pakistan would act as a buffer state. 

In the two decades leading up to the East Pakistan war of 1971, Sri Lanka had presented itself on the global stage as a thought leader and a mediator of conflict. However, as the Cold War continued to spread around the world, the country took the decision to attempt to actively chart a course for South Asia, which saw it abandon its previously held stance of non-interference. 

As the war in East Pakistan threatened to destabilise the South Asian region, Prime Minister Bandaranaike decided to actively support Pakistan. The country had developed strong ties with Muslim nations around the world, and it was a politically pragmatic approach to continue supporting a Muslim country over the perceived aggression by India. 

The Government was also concerned about the large number of refugees fleeing East Pakistan into neighbouring states, believing that this would further fragment South Asia. 


A significant shift in foreign policy


While being a staunch supporter of NAM, the abandonment of its principles of non-interference by Bandaranaike was a surprising move. However, this pointed to the fact that the ideals of the post-colonial era were being challenged by the complex geopolitical environment which saw the continued polarisation of the global community. 

For Sri Lanka, this meant that active involvement in the shifting power structures was required if the country was to avoid being swept up by one of the competing blocs. 

The resulting backlash faced by Sri Lanka over its involvement in the East Pakistan war was a signal of what awaited the country. India had continually urged Sri Lanka to maintain neutrality in the conflict, despite India itself playing an active role. 

India’s Minister of External Affairs Sardar Swaran Singh was explicit in his condemnation of and frustration with Sri Lanka over its continued support for Pakistan. In fact, the Indian Foreign Minister went as far as to suggest that Sri Lanka’s involvement had contributed to the regional instability, while suggesting that the continued support of Pakistan was a challenge to India’s strategic and security interests. 

India’s pushback against Sri Lanka for taking an active role in the conflict resulted in growing concern among the local political circles, which feared India would continue to attempt to stifle the country’s role in the region. 

The 1971 East Pakistan war marked a significant shift in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. Sri Lanka had spent the better part of two decades crafting a reputation as a leading voice for mediation and peaceful conflict resolution. With the open conflict between Pakistan and India, via East Pakistan, Sri Lanka changed tack and attempted to influence regional affairs through partisan actions. 

These decisions taken in 1971 would test the country both domestically and internationally in the coming decades as these attempts to play a pragmatic role had placed Sri Lanka at odds with its closest and largest neighbour. 


(The writer previously served as the International Affairs Director to former President Ranil Wickremesinghe, and is the current Director of Research for the Geopolitical Cartographer)


(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this publication)


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