Pope Francis was everyone’s favourite papal figure, a progressive who differed considerably from his two predecessors. The first Latin American to hold the post, and the first from the Global South, he was the first to break ground on subjects that had polarised the Church, including homosexuality, sexual abuse, and of course Gaza.
Reports indicate that until the last he was in touch with churches and church leaders in Palestine. He was certainly more forthright on the issue than Western leaders, who hesitated to invoke words like genocide. Pope Francis did, and in doing so won the love and the respect of the world.
The world since his death has witnessed a considerable escalation of tensions, including in Gaza but also between India and Pakistan. The latter continues to cause much worry. Since Tuesday’s attacks in Pahalgam, Kashmir, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has said he will go “to the ends of the earth” to find the perpetrators. Pakistani authorities have vaguely spoken of the attack being “orchestrated” and have criticised New Delhi’s “disinformation” campaign.
On Thursday, the two countries exchanged several retaliatory measures, including the closure of airspace and India’s withdrawal from the Indus Waters Treaty. Meanwhile, Kashmiri students have been facing attacks from Far-Right groups in India.
Power moves
India has always prided itself on its power moves, and its suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty shows that, when provoked, it can and will withdraw from resource sharing agreements. This has been so whatever the party in power, but it has become a convenient fait accompli for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government, which thrives today on anti-China and anti-Islamabad sentiment.
While its border dispute with China has, at least on paper, and at least for now, been resolved, its declaration of retaliation against Pakistan indicates that such issues run deep and, for the Indian political establishment, there can be no backing away.
From India’s perspective, these moves are justified. The Resistance Front (TRF), the terrorist outfit that led the attacks last week, has been linked by Indian officials to Lashkar-e-Taiba, an armed group based in Pakistan. While Islamabad categorically refutes such allegations, India has linked such groupings to the Pakistani State.
Designated as a terrorist outfit by the UK and US in 2001, Lashkar-e-Taiba has since come to encompass several organisations, including Jama’at-ud-Da’wah, thought to be responsible for the Mumbai attacks in 2008. Pakistan has since expressed willingness to proscribe such outfits, but this does not seem to have assuaged India’s suspicions about their links with the State.
At a press conference soon after the recent attacks, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said that the treaty would be “in abeyance” until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism”. The suspension, though temporary, would restrict water flows from the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab to Pakistan.
It has been noted, however, that a complete suspension would be impossible: India has politicised water in ways few countries have, but water levels from May to September are so high as to make it impossible for any country, even India, to stop them from flowing into Pakistan.
Yet all this is peripheral. As with the US, there is a strong bipartisan consensus in India over security and defence issues. India’s Congress Party is doing all it can to appear calm and calculated, but when in power, it responded in much the same way, deploying a series of power moves intended to wrest as many concessions from its rivals and neighbours while granting few concessions from its side.
Sri Lankan fears
Sri Lanka’s diplomatic encounters with New Delhi during the 1980s are a case in point: while India pushed Sri Lanka to negotiate with Tamil militants, as K.M. de Silva has noted, it did very little to make things easier for the country’s Government. The result was that New Delhi pushed too hard, leading to the inevitable pushback from the south (the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) and the north (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) after 1987.
Where India is concerned, there is, of course, a difference between Sri Lanka and Pakistan. India’s rivalry with Pakistan, and China, has been ordained by geography: it has become almost inevitable, a sine qua non of inter-state relations in South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean.
Its interventions in Sri Lanka during the 1980s showed that New Delhi was capable of extending its hard power beyond the subcontinent. While India has shied away from direct confrontations with Colombo since – not least because New Delhi cannot afford another Vietnam here, as it did with the Indian Peace Keeping Force fiasco in 1987 – it has tried to make up for its lack of connectivity through a series of initiatives to literally and metaphorically bridge the gap.
This has been roundly resisted by many Sri Lankans as well as foreign policy experts who have, justifiably, argued that it will give India the upper hand that it has vis-à-vis its neighbours over resources like water – as its dispute with Pakistan shows.
From India’s perspective, the responses to the Pahalgam attacks are, as I pointed out before, justifiable. Yet it also raises questions about what India is capable of in situations of war and direct military confrontation. I find it unlikely that this country will face such a confrontation with New Delhi, at least any time soon.
And yet, as Rathindra Kuruwita suggests in a recent piece to The Diplomat, Sri Lanka cannot afford connectivity that gives the upper hand to the other party. This will be contested by the Indian political elite, who constantly dwell on India’s good, brotherly intentions and instincts. Those intentions came to the fore in 2022, when New Delhi did what no other country could, in assisting Sri Lanka towards recovery.
Yet even such assistance has not assuaged the fears which Sri Lankans have about India’s intentions and motives. New Delhi’s response to the attacks in Kashmir will reinforce such fears, while evoking among the majority of Sri Lankans much sympathy for the victims of those attacks and their families.
(The writer is the Chief International Relations Analyst at Factum, an Asia-Pacific-focused foreign policy think tank based in Colombo and accessible via www.factum.lk. He can be reached at uditha@factum.lk)