As the talk of sanctions appears to grow bold within the academic/research community and think tank circles in Washington and abroad, it remains unclear if President-elect Trump’s Iran policy will entail economic sanctions as part of its broader regional strategy.

Irrespective of how one perceives former President Biden’s Iran policy, the strategic community remains in a dilemma over the role of sanctions within President-elect Trump’s Iran policy. Although two State Department officials strongly echoed developing ‘greater pressure’ during the new administration over President Pezeshkian’s regime, the significance of this ‘great pressure’ remains unclear. Although none of the experts during a discussion with the authors supported (even remotely) the possibility of ‘changing the regime’ in case of a deadlock, many experts pointed towards the possibility of backchannel discussions between the new administration and Pezeshkian’s Government, with the latest members joining the Trump administration’s security departments expressing a tone ‘devoid of economic sanctions’. 

To that end, the authors predict, the Trump administration’s Iran policy of ‘greater pressure’ could either be of: 

a)  New engagement initiatives with a reformist President Pezeshkian’s regime with the broader objective of developing confidence within the European Union to foster engagement with Tehran

Or,

b)  A strategic isolation policy, catered on regional support (from Saudi Arabia or Qatar) by Washington without inflicting fluctuations in the oil prices

New engagement initiatives?

Those who have yet to join Trump’s security team opined on the possibility of a new deal during their discussion with the authors. In seeking more enquiry, one scholar argued about the possibility of a JCPOA 2.0, reflecting Trump’s first administration’s engagement with Tehran. However, none in the State Department remotely mentioned the revival of the JCPOA or an improved version of the 2015 Nuclear deal with Iran. Taking JCPOA 2.0 as a hypothesis, which some in Washington expressed favourable opinions, it will, nonetheless, be rigged with challenges for the new administration. Tehran predicted Trump’s return to office in the recently concluded Presidential Elections, resulting in a determined late President Raisi’s administration over not engaging with former President Biden’s efforts on compliance leading to JCPOA. According to one estimate, Washington reached out numerous times to Tehran during former President Biden’s presidency, with multiple engagements/initiatives – which Tehran refused, citing the efficacy of these engagements ‘reflecting a certain expiry’.

There is no doubt on President-elect Trump’s administration replacing any/all policies implemented by his predecessor with the intent of bringing Tehran to the negotiation table. That said, taking note of Iran’s current strategic posture, the time appears ripe for President-elect Trump to negotiate with Tehran. One scholar in Tehran opines on profound successes achieved by Iran in its nuclear programme, referring to escalated efforts in the delivery of warheads (in particular, progress made at the rocket assembly) since the 7 October attacks. It remains unclear if Tehran would undo any advancement (in its nuclear programme) since 7 October, as any progress on the nuclear programme will only consolidate its position during future negotiations with Washington. In the context of Tehran’s weaker position in the region, especially after Jerusalem’s sustained campaign that resulted in the obliteration of Tier-1/Tier-2 leadership of Hezbollah and Hamas, the odds are in the favour of Washington to bring Tehran for broader engagement and bilateral talks. Taking note of the argument mentioned above, it remains unclear how Tehran would react to any discussions of restrictions brought by Washington. Although Washington could provide a lucrative financial package, perhaps even relaxing some sanctions on the regime, in exchange for Tehran forfeiting financial assistance to both Hezbollah/Hamas, which it could (at least for some time), giving it the necessary space to restructure the organisations again. 

That said, even then, Washington’s negotiations with Iran, especially in the light of it making successes in its nuclear programme, can derail in many ways:

a)   Since former President Obama’s administration, Tehran has maintained a stand of not engaging in nuclear matters. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi reiterated this stance on 16 November, referring to any chance of atomic negotiations as ‘limited’ and pointing towards the JCPOA as the final agenda for negotiations, if at all. Iranian FM Araqchi’s statement reflects a continuation of the same policy even during President-elect Trump’s second term, despite Washington’s ‘great’ pressure on Tehran

b) Washington would very much aim to curtail Tehran’s activities in the Middle East, essentially asking Tehran to forfeit its strategic deterrence policy, which not only puts it in the corner but threatens its national security, especially when its Axis’ is organisationally disarrayed

c) It remains to be seen if Washington’s negotiation with Tehran crosses the nuclear threshold. Although some experts estimate Iran to be much closer to assembling a nuclear warhead than anticipated and by another estimate, it has attained the capability to assemble weapons grade-war head in less than two weeks or even has achieved the potency to assemble somewhat effective tactical nuclear warheads in many of its undisclosed facilities. That said, choosing nuclear weapons over negotiations will not be an easy path for Tehran despite it being cornered strategically

d)  Even if President-elect Trump’s administration engages in a policy of ‘great pressure’, it may only be for a short term (it could bring, at best, Tehran to the negotiating table), which means Washington needs long-term policy options to retain Tehran at the negotiating table, without having fluctuations in the oil market

Strategic isolation

Suppose the negotiation fails due to the obstacles above (or unforeseen). In that case, sustained hurdles may force the Trump administration to isolate Iran through sanctions, followed by increasing US military assistance to Israeli defence forces’ operations against the Iranian Axis’. The authors negate the hypothesis of Washington willing to put boots on the ground in support of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon or Gaza in such a scenario, instead arguing on the imposition of heavier sanctions with the intent of crippling Tehran’s capability and sheer will to support its Axis’. Such a decision could halt Tehran’s capability to provide material support to Moscow, strengthen air defence abilities, acquire air assets, or support allied factions/groups in the Middle East. It is premature to predict the potency of such sanctions. Still, in such a scenario, Washington would impose sanctions to halt Tehran’s actions from further engulfing the region into prolonged conflict.

That said, in such a scenario, Washington’s strategy of isolating Iran could vary from short-term to more sustained sanctions, which is again rigged with apprehension:

a)  Such sanctions are not nearly enough to prevent Tehran from attaining nuclear capability – taking note of public information/analysis over Iran’s ability to assemble the nuclear warhead, it possesses the capability to do it in the months before President-elect Trump’s oath to office. 

This would further mean that the new administration can, at best, prevent Tehran from conducting operations in the Middle East, curtailing it from further escalation/retaliation. In such a scenario, the Trump administration would have no choice but to replicate Biden’s Tehran approach, mirroring regional consequences with domestic criticism. That said, although there is no clear path for what the Trump administration’s Tehran policy would bear a form, some clarity at the policy level could bring better outcomes. For example, if Washington decides to isolate Tehran via rigorous sanctions, Tehran may not have a choice but to sit at the table – and still exercise influence in the region.

Conclusion

With President-elect Trump still months away from taking his oath, the time is ripe for the incoming administration to draft policy based on its expectations with Tehran, making its objectives more explicit and intentions precise. If Washington aims to build a policy around sanctions, it may reflect efficacy on paper but have a short shelf life. Many in the Trump administration opine about the effectiveness of a sanctions-induced strategy for Tehran, but they need to address the implementation of such a strategy in a multipolar world.

(Mishra is the Marie Curie Research Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales. Prof. Kaunert is a Professor of International Security at Dublin City University and a Professor of Policing and Security at the University of South Wales)

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The views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication