The purpose of the proposed Bill on Contempt of Court is to criminalise acts which may be considered to constitute the offence of contempt of court and to punish it. Clearly, this proposed Bill is meant to create offences under contempt of court and therefore, the purpose is to create criminal offences.
In creating criminal offences, there are set legal processes and legal provisions binding in all instances where offences are created and also when the offences are investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated. Once an offence is created, the ordinary course of law that prevails in the country takes over and these processes should be followed. That is the very meaning of equality before the law and this provision is recognised by Article 12(1) of the Constitution. Thus, a person accused and dealt with under the law for contempt of court should be treated first as a suspect, then as an accused and finally convicted as a convicted person, all within the general framework of the law that prevails within the country.
Besides, equality before the law as recognised under Article 12(1), is also based on the very notion of the rule of law. In a succinct definition of the rule of law, former Lord Chief Justice (CJ) of England and Wales, Tom Bingham has summed up this notion as follows: “all persons and authorities within the State, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the courts”. Thus, all the obligations and entitlements of everybody emanate from the same principles which are equally applied to all.
From this, it follows that like any other criminal offence, contempt of court as an offence should have a clear definition. As can be demonstrated from every offence in the Penal Code and other offences created under other statutes, there is always a clear definition which gives the boundaries within the scope of which the crime is understood and also prosecuted and adjudicated.
The definition of the crime sets the limits for the investigations into any complaints relating to the commission of such a crime to compare the evidence available and to assess whether the requirements of the definition have been met by the kind of evidence that is available. Thus, the investigators into the crime are strictly bound to conduct their operations within the framework of the definition of the crime. This first of all implies that there is a definition of the crime.
The task of the Attorney General in particular is to examine the available evidence and to assess whether there is a likelihood of conducting a successful prosecution in order to prove the elements of the crime as enshrined in the definition of the crime. If no such definition exists, the prosecutor has no jurisdiction to go into the matter at all.
The same is true about courts and judges. A trial judge when conducting a trial on a crime will strictly confine himself/herself to the legal limits within the definition of the crime. All other matters will be excluded from all trial proceedings. The presiding judge will ensure that nothing outside the scope of the definition of the crime being tried will be brought into the proceedings. And, in doing so, he/she will also be bound by the laws relating to the Criminal Procedure and also the Evidence Ordinance. All such trials are only possible when a definition of crime is available.
The defence of the accused is also confined within the framework of the definition of the crime. The accused may take up the position that if there is no definition of the crime, that he/she is unable to answer the charges. His/her duty in offering a defence is determined by the legal definition of the crime on which he/she is charged. He/she has a right to know the charge and its legal definitions, and he/she has the right to get the assistance of lawyers, in order to have such definitions and all legal matters explained to him/her and also articulate his/her own position in terms of this legal framework. Where a definition clearly exists, the accused can prove his/her position by challenging any of the important aspects of the elements of the crime. If he/she successfully challenges any of these aspects, he/she would be discharged of any criminal liability. Even if he/she were to be convicted mistakenly, he/she would have a right to appeal and in the appeal, he/she could take up matters about the definition of the crime under which he/she is charged and as to whether the prosecution has discharged its duties of proving all the essential elements of the crime against him/her through legally valid evidence. If any of this fails, he/she has the right to be discharged.
All these matters are important because in the draft Contempt of Court Bill, there is no clear definition or in fact any definition at all of what is called the ‘crime’ of contempt of court. Therefore, as this particular statute is meant entirely to be a criminal statute, it fails to be such a statute at all. The mere passing of a statute by whatever majority cannot create a criminal offence for as long as the criminal offence has not been statutorily defined. Therefore, voting on a Bill that is supposed to create a criminal offence, which has failed to do so, is a futile exercise. Thus, proceeding with this Bill as it is now will not serve any legally valid purpose because the offence that it is trying to create is not defined by law.
The danger of passing such a statute is that it could be made use for any purpose at all and there would be no predictability about the limits and the manner in which such a law can be misused.
It should be noted that misuse is possible as all persons are human and therefore are susceptible to committing errors inadvertently or even wilfully. The persons engaged in the administration of justice despite all their good intentions and qualifications could still commit errors.
There are instances in which such things have happened relating to contempt of court which has already come under disapproval of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) when examining two cases submitted by Sri Lankan citizens to this Committee under the provisions of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These cases are the case of Tony Michael Anthony Fernando (1189/2003) and the case of S.B. Dissanayake (E-3585/04 EN). Particularly in the case of Fernando, the alleged offence was that he talked loudly in court. It would be quite strange if talking loudly in court becomes a part of a definition of the crime of contempt of court. As recorded by the UNHRC, what really happened was that Fernando took an objection to the then CJ presiding over a case in which Fernando was the complainant. Despite the objection, the CJ presided over the very bench and asked Fernando the basis on which he is making this objection, i.e. objection to the hearing of the case by the CJ. Fernando read from the Constitutional Article 12(1) and said that that is the basis on which he is making the submission. The CJ immediately asked him to stop speaking, threatening that if he were to speak a word more, he would have one month more to each of those words for the sentence that he has in mind which was one year of rigourous imprisonment (RI). And Fernando was taken from the Court to the prison immediately and spent the full sentence. It was this case that was disapproved of by the UNHRC in a written view expressed under the special procedure recognised under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Similarly, Dissanayake was sentenced for two years of RI for using some derogatory words against the court. In neither of these occasions did the accused have the benefit of being charged under a well defined offence with the description of the possible consequences.
The question of the definition also arises due to some other provisions of the proposed Bill such as Sections 8(1)(b) and 8(1)(c). These subsections allow a motion to be filed by the Attorney General (AG) or any other person about the commission of an offence under the Act in the courts. There is no provision within the Act explaining what is the process by which the AG should get involved in matters relating to contempt of court. What is the process by which the AG receives information, processes information and also assesses the legal basis of such information as well as the legal implications of this information? In the absence of a definition of an offence, all the considerations by the AG would be purely of a subjective nature. The AG thus becomes an officer having to exercise the power about an undefined matter. This, in any case, makes it impossible to perform in a legally valid manner. Therefore, the whole process of illegal definitions, and other matters which are arising out of the general law of the country and the new process of the law, should all be taken into consideration in trying to define the role of the AG in terms of prosecutions on the contempt of court offence. In all other crimes, the AG is not an initiator of the legal proceedings. There is a whole process which proceeds by way of investigations and the gathering and assessment of evidence before the AG comes into the picture and these are the responsibilities of other departments and officers.
Besides being legally absurd and vague, these provisions of the Act also leave room for abuse. There had been cases when the work of the AG’s Department has been criticised by lawyers appearing in cases, for example, when they point out that the information provided by the AG’s Department’s representative to the court is false or incorrect, but the AG’s Department has moved that such criticisms amount to contempt of court and therefore the lawyers should be prosecuted for contempt of court. In one instance, such an application was recorded by the court and was referred to the CJ for his consideration on whether to take action against the lawyer. This shows the tendency to extend the contempt of court idea not only to courts but also Departments such as the AG’s Department.
Also, the Act states that any other person can also bring up a matter by way of a motion. This practice of any other person bringing in a petition has been a practice which has come to the notice of even courts as a possible abusive practice. In the famous case of Nathasha Edirisooriya, the case relating to the use of the ICCPR Act came to be condemned in a highly appreciated judgement by a High Court Judge who noted that a mere petition by whoever a prominent person, even a famous monk, by itself should not lead to the beginning of legal proceedings, implying that without satisfying the requirements of the law relating to criminal offence, actions should not be taken. It applies even more to serious issues such as contempt of court which unscrupulous persons could abuse the same.
Thus, all these matters require clear legal articulation if the proposed law is not to create opportunities for all sorts of abuses rather than for the protection of proper and peaceful proceedings of cases in individual instances which is the core element of the contempt of court jurisdiction.
(The writer is the Asian Human Rights Commission’s Policy and Programmes Director)
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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication.