Over the last decade, multiple incidents and crises in the sea’s around our island, points to the logical realisation that Sri Lanka needs a better equipped and resourced Coast Guard, and a Navy. The growing complexity with transnational maritime crime in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), numerous marine emergencies and pollution stemming for the massive volume of shipping that cross Sri Lanka’s coastal waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), increasing climate change-related disasters, the rise of non-state actors and the renewal of sea-bed warfare, and growing geopolitical tension at our doorstep, all point to the need for a paradigm shift in Sri Lanka’s security and defence architecture. While some sections of the Sri Lankan State have been talking about the need for the change, there has been little public discourse about it. Without robust public discourse and resulting political will, there will be little change.
As difficult as it may be for some Sri Lankans to imagine it, Sri Lanka is indeed an island nation. And as a nation hedging its bets on becoming a maritime services hub, and one which wants to gain sustainably from its ‘Blue Economy’ – last years ‘catchphrase’, Sri Lanka must have a robust maritime security mechanism. As such, Sri Lanka needs to shift its land force (Army) focus, to that of a maritime nature, with a significant push given to the aviation part of the equation.
Sri Lankans often think that our interests are limited to our territorial waters, our EEZ at best, and some believe that our influence and reach should end there. Such thinking has shaped Sri Lankan maritime vision for decades, and is extremely short sighted. Sri Lanka must understand that what happens in and around the Indian Ocean, and beyond, affects us at home. There is a real impact, when a submarine cable is damaged, deliberately or otherwise; when key lines of communication and trade such as the Red Sea are made vulnerable to merchant shipping, Sri Lankan imports and exports suffer. The war-time high-risk surcharge by insurers during the time the ‘Sea Tigers’ took to the coastal waters around the island should be a clear indicator for Sri Lanka about what would happen if the situation in the Red Sea is left unchecked and unchallenged. If the Houthi attacks on the Red Sea shipping is deemed an operational success due to inaction by those affected, what is to stop other non-state actors, rogue nations from copying the trend, it would make maritime trade that is indispensable to Sri Lanka’s economic survival, that much difficult.
The MV New Diamond tanker fire incident, and the MV X-Press Pearl incident, highlighted that Sri Lanka lacks effective regulatory systems, response capacity, subject matter experts and coordination to ensure our national interests are protected in our waters and beyond. Facing growing environmental change-related crises, it is evident that Sri Lanka needs to capacity build and synergise our domestic and regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR), and ocean pollution control measures. Growing concerns about Norco, arms and human trafficking also points to the need for a robust Air-Maritime security structure. Sri Lanka is also dependent on dozens of undersea data cables which connects the island to the world, and helps in network in the digital domain. The regulatory framework to protect such cables in our waters and EEZ remain shelved, and incomplete. Sri Lanka’s growing fishing industry, which provides much of the island’s protein requirement, and is becoming a key export needs better regulation and support. Our fishing vessels already fish in the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea, and the high seas off Africa to the waters off Indonesia. The recent hijacking of a local fishing vessel with six Sri Lankans, points to reach we should have. This is why the Sri Lanka Navy should be modernised and better resourced, so that Sri Lanka begins to use it better as a tool of statecraft and diplomacy. The Sri Lanka Coast Guard, can be an important tool for law enforcement, which if established as a civilian-led organisation and well resourced, would be an important component of securing Sri Lanka’s national interest.
When Ranil Wickremesinghe was elected to the office of the President, following a turbulent period in Sri Lanka, he stated that the island nation will commence a ‘Defence Review’ and ‘right size’ the bloated armed forces, who were not effectively demobilised post war, and was taking up a sizable portion of the state expenditure ‘pie’. While several committees have been appointed, re-set and a secretariat for the task stood up, a critical element of the ‘Review’ remains dormant. It has up-to-date lacked effective parliamentary oversight and the necessary public discourse which a review of a vital national policy ought to have. Sri Lankan Policy making has often been Ad-hoc, and done behind closed doors, which often leads to ill-advised policies that often flop causing significant damage to national interest. Sri Lanka can’t afford to make such a mistake with the Defence Review. And being a democratic state, Sri Lanka can’t blindside the public with such a complex piece of policy, which a government will likely rail-road through. The Government must include the people in policy making. That is how good governance works.