Intelligence services play a vital role in providing governments with credible information about possible threats to the State and its population. A State's intelligence apparatus, more commonly known today as the ‘intelligence community’, is tasked with making sense of complex issues and calling attention to emerging problems, threats to national interests, risks and opportunities. The role and task of intelligence is linked to all forms of governance since the beginning of recorded history, and continues to evolve, helping actors in the international arena and nation states maintain order, stability and security, internally, regionally and globally. 

Intelligence services are a vital and instrumental part of statecraft and governance. This is especially true for a small littoral state like Sri Lanka, which depends largely on diplomacy and intelligence to survive in the new world order.

Over the last three decades, the role and use of State intelligence services in Sri Lanka has been a hotly debated topic, with many views and opinions held on the issue. Like in many other nations, democratic or otherwise, the public have a ‘love-hate’ relationship with intelligence agencies. While movies and books may romanticise intelligence, or ‘spies’ in common parlance, the reality of the intelligence community is not a rosy one. More often than not, the role and employment of intelligence is misunderstood, abused or bungled by those within the community and those who they answer to. Sri Lanka is no exception. Despite being a long-standing democracy, Sri Lanka has not always been able to effectively frame its intelligence apparatus within the expected boundaries of the constitution and democratic norms. Sri Lanka doesn’t stand alone in this challenge, with many other nations falling to do so during different periods of their history.   

Today, the Sri Lankan intelligence community, ‘warts and all’ is again under the spotlight of public scrutiny. One may argue that it is so because there has been little oversight and accountability of the powerful intelligence apparatus of the island, over the last few decades. Like any organisation, the Intelligence community, if left unchecked and not held accountable, rots from within. This has been the experience of many nations, be they global powers or small states like Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has had its share of Intelligence successes, failures, neglect and rogue actors, all contributing to the diverse tapestry of opinions which have formed about the ‘agents of the State’ since independence.  One must note that Sri Lanka’s intelligence apparatus has functioned, without the vital component for nearly 76 years; a national security policy. As such, the intelligence community of Sri Lanka was not able to frame its role and task, nor its operational parameters based on national policy. This has led to ad-hoc guidance and policy changes from one government to another. It has also made the Sri Lanka intelligence apparatus weak and vulnerable to politicisation and exploitation.    

The Easter Sunday bombing of April 2019, is the latest incident which has brought the covert organisations under greater scrutiny. There is much debate and allegations about the role played by the Sri Lankan intelligence community in relation to the Easter Sunday attack. There are allegations about involvement of foreign intelligence activity in relation to the attacks as well. 

While allegations and theories of conspiracy are yet to be proven before a court of law, two facts are evident to the objective observer. First, that there was a failure in the intelligence and governance decision making cycle in relation to the 2019 bombing, which failed to prevent several coordinated mass casualty events. Second, is that there is a growing distrust of intelligence services among the public. The second issue is compounded by the fact that Sri Lanka is in a transitional period where there are strong trust deficits between the State and citizenry. The matter is further compounded by politicians, religious leaders and others politicising the tragedy and by giving credibility to conspiracy theories. To say that the Easter Sunday bombing was a failure of governance, and a gross shortcoming of the upkeep of national security is a valid argument. However, by politicising the issue, and by polarising the population with multiple conspiracy theories, Sri Lanka’s political and civil society leadership has effectively muddied the waters so much that the victims of the attacks may never get the justice and closure they deserve. Given all that has been said and the narratives which are being pushed, the space for the victims to find some measure of justice has been thrown in disarray. And that is a tragedy on its own. It is also prudent for Sri Lanka to learn from foreign examples where the witch-hunt of the intelligence service post major failure, in place of review and reform, can further damage a State’s national security capacity.

Taking stock of what is transpiring, it is evident that Sri Lanka needs to review and recalibrate its intelligence apparatus. While many in the intelligence community reject the idea, Sri Lanka needs to urgently formulate a legislative framework for its intelligence community, with oversight. The intelligence agencies need to be accountable to the State and law, as any other State institution. Further, Sri Lanka must shed its political divisions, and develop a well-debated and widely-accepted national security policy, which can be the guide for security, defence and intelligence policy. In this era of socio-political change, this is one area the state must address diligently.