What is the primary mission of the armed forces? Broadly speaking, they are there to act as a deterrence alongside diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure victory over domestic or foreign aggressor, while also defending the national security interests and sovereignty of the country. 

There are many views about the kind of armed forces Sri Lanka needs, and while the general consensus is that the armed forces need to be made more leaner; less in numbers and expenditure, there has surprisingly been little or no public discourse about the need to ensure, the armed forces we are left with, post review is capable, and ‘fit for task’. Despite being an election year, with much focus on state sector reforms, the Sri Lankan political landscape seems reluctant to debate defence sector reforms, which, going by the expenditure numbers, warrant a more robust discussion. The lack of such, is indicative of the closed nature ‘national security’ and ‘defence’ matters are dealt with.  

The term ‘national security’ has been bastardised by Sri Lankan politicians to their gain for decades and has lost its value among the public. Such long-term trivialisation of an important state function and duty, will undoubtedly have a negative impact on Sri Lanka’s defence posture for decades to come. Further, the longstanding culture of politicisation of the armed forces, and their utilisation as a ‘manpower – jack of all trades’ to aid various state institutions, and in non-state services, such as upkeep of religious places of worship, and use in subsidised construction projects, has invariably eroded the public perception of the armed forces. Many in the armed forces are also reportedly disillusioned with their role and task, with many deserting the service in droves following the economic crisis. Recently, the armed forces announced a general amnesty period, through which thousands who were AWOL have sought to discharge themselves from service.

The Government, post economic crisis and bankruptcy, initiated a long overdue review of the defence establishment, with a focus on the three armed forces, which account for a lion’s share of Sri Lanka’s defence expenditure. The review, which is a positive step in the right direction, has largely been a closed door affair, with little transparency, raising questions about what sort of defence policies, defence posture and capacity a future version of the armed forces will be. The Defence Review 2030, is currently underway and is carried out by a panel of state officials and retired military personnel led by the National Security Advisor. While the President as the Commander-in-Chief has stated that following the Defence Review, he expects the Sri Lankan armed forces to be transformed into a technologically advanced, leaner – more capable force structure, yet, it is unclear if the bureaucrats involved in the review process are on the same page. The primary purpose of the Defence Review cannot simply be to reduce the defence expenditure, it must also be balanced with envisaging a practical, more capable and leaner – meaner armed forces structure for the post-2030 period. If not, Sri Lanka may end up with a ceremonial armed force – all polished brass and band, for ceremonial pomp and pageantry, and may likely have to relearn painful lessons of being unprepared, and not ‘fit for task’ like they learned in 1971, 1983, and 2019. These are not lessons Sri Lanka can afford to learn again, financially, emotionally and as a nation. Given the evolving nature of geopolitics in our neighbourhood – the Indian Ocean, and the wide threat spectrum Sri Lanka as a littoral state faces, lying beside a vital shipping lane, the Sri Lankan armed forces of 2030 and beyond, would like to have to be better equipped, trained, integrated and resourced. They will also require strong air-maritime forces, with robust intelligence, command and control synergy. The need for wider connectivity, both in cyber, naval and air domains, and ability to work with other regional and extra-regional actors will also be vital to ensure Sri Lankan national interests are met.  As such, the post 2030 defence posture must be reflective of Sri Lanka’s economic standing, security and foreign policy outlook of that decade, and not of 2022-2024.    

It is disheartening that none of the political parties have bought the Defence Review up for debate, nor moved to formulate their policy proposals. National Security and Defence, especially for a small state which is trying to get on the path to recovery, are vital segments of effective governance, and warrants better public and policy dialogue. Economic reforms are essential to recover, but governance reforms are what will keep us from sliding back to crisis, and conflict.