• Undersea sabotage/warfare forces world to refocus on old threat
• Serious implication for digital industry, economy, connectivity, sovereignty if gaps in legislation and capacity are left unaddressed

Sri Lanka’s long-stalled legislative protection for critical connectivity infrastructure, the National Submarine Cables Protection and Resilience Framework (NSCPRF) may once again be revisited, with the current Government taking steps to study the topic, it is learnt.

This, amid growing international concern regarding acts of sabotage and a return of ‘Cold War era’ seabed warfare tactics in conflict hotspots, with multiple undersea cables and pipelines damaged and severed due to ‘accidents’ or sabotage in the Nordic Sea, the Baltic Sea, and most recently, in the Gulf of Aden and the Taiwan Strait.

When contacted, Deputy Minister of Digital Economy Eranga Weeraratne confirmed to The Sunday Morning that there had been an initial discussion about undersea cable protection. He declined to elaborate on whether the new initiative would see continuation of the NSCPRF, but added that with the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka (TRCSL) under the ministry’s purview, it would be part of the discussion. 

TRCSL Director General Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Bandula Herath stated that a committee appointed by the Government had held a meeting last week to discuss the topic. 

“There is a committee and last week we had a meeting; we will have another meeting in a few weeks. At the last meeting, we identified the areas which the respective members will study. It is an ongoing process. We already have a draft amendment on submarine cable protection, so the process is ongoing,” Herath said.

Last month, during a workshop organised by the National Security College of the Australian National University on ‘New Frontiers in Maritime Information Sharing in the Indian Ocean,’ concerns about undersea cable safety and protection was discussed at length in Colombo, with many security experts raising concerns about how to respond to such tactics, which both state and non-state actors can employ.  

Why SL needs new laws

The Government of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has emphasised the need to improve the island’s digitalisation, both of State services and the private sector. Many experts have opined that digitalisation will greatly benefit Sri Lanka. Already, multiple public services and State institutions are being modernised with digitalisation. 

Sri Lanka also has designs to roll out more modern telecommunication and digital infrastructure, with 5G and 6G technology being considered and plans afoot to expand Sri Lanka’s digital services and ICT industries to boost exports.

However, the nation’s digital communications umbilical cord to the world remains vulnerable.

This is due to the bureaucracy dragging its feet on enacting legislation on the protection of undersea data cables. Sri Lanka’s connectivity, trade, and digital economy as an island nation is largely dependent on seven undersea fibre-optic data cables which remain underprotected by local legislation. 

This gap in legislation leaves Sri Lanka’s national security and economic recovery in a vulnerable state, with a part of the critical digital infrastructure of the country lacking a legal framework for protection. 

Such legislation, had it been introduced at the time it was discussed, would have placed Sri Lanka as the regional leader in submarine cable protection, offering leverage to the island State as it seeks to improve its ‘hub’ status and attract tech investments, especially in tandem with the Personal Data Protection Act.

The risks posed to Sri Lanka’s under undersea critical maritime and digital infrastructure is not one the country can afford to ignore and wait to fix ‘once something has happened’; as our economy is fragile, the island cannot weather serious disruptions at this stage. While Sri Lanka may not be at war or linked to any ongoing conflicts, even an accidental severing of such cables can have a serious impact on the national economy.

Sri Lanka is no stranger to the dangers posed to the submarine data cables which link the island to the world. In 2004, it suffered its first major internet and international communications outage which lasted a few days when the Indian-flagged merchant vessel State of Nagaland dragged its anchor over the SEA-ME-WE3 data cable that supplied linkages to Sri Lanka Telecom (SLT). 

The incident occurred in a coastal area which has restrictions put in place to stop ships from deploying anchor. SLT later took the vessel owners to court seeking $ 5 million as compensation for damages. The cost to the economy from the outage has not been calculated.

Globally, submarine cables carry 95% of the world’s total communications, while satellites are only able to handle 7% of global data traffic. Many key submarine cables that link Europe with the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Australia, the Pacific Islands, and Africa lay on the seabed of Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The highest density of submarine cables in the Indian Ocean falls in Sri Lanka’s EEZ or travels around the island. 

There are three main challenges to uninterrupted submarine cable operations. These include natural disasters, accidental human-induced damage, and deliberate interference and sabotage. 

The fact that most of the networks are laid, owned, and operated by private corporate entities further complicates the issue. The recent incidents in the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and near the Taiwan Strait, alongside those due to increasing geopolitical contention and conflict, point to a return of seabed warfare.  

Sri Lanka is connected to the world through the following seven submarine data cables: the Bay of Bengal Gateway (BBG), South East Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 3 (SMW3) submarine cable, South East Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 4 (SMW4) submarine cable, South East Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 5 (SMW5) submarine cable, Bharat Lanka Cable System (BLCS), FLAG Alcatel-Lucent Optical Network (FALCON) submarine cable system, and Dhiraagu and SLT Cable System (DSCS). 

According to the Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka has an internet penetration of 52% as of 2020 with nearly 77% of internet users using smart mobile phones to access the World Wide Web. 

Global and local use of the digital world of the internet increased significantly following the physical and travel restrictions brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has pushed online businesses and trade volumes to record heights. 

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, undersea cables are built, owned, operated, and maintained primarily by private sector companies. Approximately 98% of the world’s undersea cables are manufactured and installed by four private firms.

Early efforts that never left the harbour

The drafting of the NSCPRF, a pursuit which began under the ‘Yahapalana’ Government’s tenure in 2018, completed in 2020 and earmarked to be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for approval in 2022, was again shifted to another branch of the Government without being submitted for approval. 

The piece of legislation was then kicked around like the many ‘policy footballs’ Sri Lankan bureaucrats like to play with, and sent from ministry to agency for completion. Having been kicked around the Ministries of Technology and Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General’s Department, it finally ended up at former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Secretariat for completion. 

However, no legislation was submitted to Parliament and approved, leaving Sri Lanka vulnerable as it was found to be in 2004, and the process for the legislation began in 2019.

Commenting on the stalled legislation, former Chief of Staff and Chief Hydrographer of the Navy, former Joint Chief Hydrographer to the Government, and International Consultant for Undersea Cables for the United Nations (UN) Admiral (Retd) Y.N. Jayarathna said: “Sri Lanka’s narrow continental shelf makes submarine cables making landfall in Sri Lanka much more secure. The coastal radar surveillance system maintained by the Sri Lanka Navy and Coast Guard augment the monitoring and evidence/proof capacities of this island State. 

“The nation also remains a vital landfall for any submarine cable that goes across the Indian Ocean because of technical necessities such as the need to power and amplify modern-day fibre optics. 

“Sri Lanka demonstrated its own submarine cable protection framework in the past because of 24/7 coastal surveillance despite the lack of a dedicated legal framework. In 2019, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) selected Sri Lanka to launch a pilot project on submarine cable protection and a resilience framework, but that draft still remains to be implemented.”

Increasing threats to cables and NATO’s new mission

Like the incidents which took place since the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war and the action of Houthi rebels in coastal Yemen, recent ‘attacks’ or damages to undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, a vital nexus for global communications and energy supply, have become a focal point of security concern for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

In response, NATO in January launched the ‘Baltic Sentry’ initiative aimed at deterring and responding to potential threats, including recent acts of sabotage of undersea cables. Announced on 14 January at a summit in Helsinki, Finland, the new mission is stated to be a multi-domain operation that will see the deployment of NATO warships, drones, maritime patrol aircraft, and advanced surveillance systems to protect critical underwater infrastructure.

In March 2024, three data cables which ran under the Red Sea that provide global internet and telecommunications were cut, with Yemen’s Houthi rebels suspected to have been behind the incident. The impact on digital communications for Yemen was significant and took a long time to be mended. 

Security experts believe that the cables were being targeted in the Houthi campaign, which the rebels describe as an effort to pressure Israel to end its war on Hamas in the Gaza Strip. However, the Houthis have denied attacking the lines.

Similarly, there have been multiple undersea cables linking Taiwan that have been damaged recently. Taiwan, another potential conflict hotspot with China trying to exert control over the island, has flagged concerns about commercial vessels linked to China trying to sabotage its critical infrastructure. 

The cable damaged off Taiwan was the $ 500 million Trans-Pacific Express cable linking Taiwan and other parts of East Asia with the US West Coast. The latest incident, which took place in January near Keelung on the island, saw Taiwanese Coast Guard officials suspecting a Cameroon-flagged vessel, the Shunxin 39, as the responsible party. Despite being Cameroon-flagged, the Shunxin 39 is reportedly owned by a Hong Kong firm.

Australian example

Australia, Sri Lanka’s Indian Ocean neighbour, which is also heavily dependent on such critical maritime infrastructure for connectivity and commerce, introduced legislation to create protection zones for these vital linkages through an amendment in 2005 to a 1997 act.

Some experts have called Australia’s legal protection framework for undersea cables a ‘gold standard,’ in part because it criminalised damage to cables, fulfilling an obligation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and because it has created clearly demarcated ‘protection zones’ at sea and in coastal waters to ensure risk reduction to undersea cables which make landfall. 

Australian law makes it an offence to damage a submarine cable in a protection zone, to engage in a restricted or prohibited activity in a protection zone, install a submarine cable without the appropriate permit, and breach conditions of a permit issued by the State. The nation’s law also finds an individual to have committed an offence if they fail to comply with a regulator direction to remove unlawfully installed submarine cables.

Under Schedule 3A of the Telecommunications Act of 1997, the Australian Communications and Media Authority has declared three submarine cable protection zones; Northern Sydney, Southern Sydney, and Perth. These zones protect submarine telecommunication cables that are of national significance to Australia.

In 2021, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) charged the 59-year-old Master of container ship Maersk Surabaya, which allegedly damaged the Australia Singapore Cable off the West Australian coast, in what is believed to be the first prosecution by the AFP for the alleged offence. 

“A section of the subsea communications cable in the Perth Submarine Cable Protection Zone, approximately 10 km offshore from City Beach, was disabled early on 1 August 2021. Allegations that a passing vessel had damaged the cable – causing approximately $ 1.5 million in damages – were reported to the AFP on 3 August (2021). 

“An investigation by AFP officers in WA and Victoria has resulted in the arrest of the 59-year-old Ukrainian national. The man was the Master of a cargo ship, Maersk Surabaya, which Police say had been anchored approximately 500 m from the protection zone and allegedly dragged its anchor through the area in high winds, snagging and damaging the 20 m-deep cable,” the AFP said.

While it is commendable that the new Government has revisited the long-stalled efforts to create a legal framework for protection of undersea cables and to act as a deterrent, it must act quickly.