A mediator is often a neutral and respected third party that aims to resolve prolonged disputes. In the context of international relations, such prolonged disputes are usually associated with governments (of either two or more nation states) or they may even be internal disputes within a nation state, between its government and non-state actors such as secessionist movements, drug cartels, trade unions, or even fundamentalist organisations.
In all these instances, it is the public that suffers, and prolonged disputes are likely to result in conflicts where the suffering is passed down to future generations, thus fuelling more resentment and complications. Hence, mediators are vital to bring conflicting parties to the negotiating table to agree on peaceful solutions.
Historical background
In China, mediation has a strong connection to the country’s three main religious philosophies, namely Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism. Mediation is a practice that is considered as a means of preserving social harmony and relationships, thus leading to social stability and inclusive development of societies.
During its imperial period, China intervened as a mediator in international disputes. Examples include the Tang dynasty (618-907) resolving disputes between nomadic groups in Central Asia to prevent potential disruptions to the Silk Route and during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) where Admiral Zheng He intervened to resolve internal disputes in the Malacca Sultanate.
However, as technologically advanced European colonial powers and imperial Japan overpowered imperial China, Beijing gradually lost its leverage to act as a decisive mediator in international conflicts. With China entering its ‘century of humiliation’ (1839-1945), its status as an international mediator gradually diminished.
During the Cold War (1947-1991), the United States and the Soviet Union intervened as mediators in several international disputes. Examples include the US’s role as a mediator in the Camp David Accords of 1978, which resulted in the normalisation of Israel-Egypt relations, and the Tashkent Declaration of 1965, mediated by the Soviet Union, which marked the end of the Indo-Pakistani War that had broken out that year.
However, the role of a mediator was not solely limited to the superpowers at the time because countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also acted as decisive mediators.
The Algiers Accords of 1981 mediated by Algeria saw the US and Iran amicably ending the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-1981. Notably, the Colombo proposals of 1962, which were jointly mediated by six NAM countries (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic) paved the way to end the Sino-Indian War, which took place that year.
China’s credentials
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party maintained a non-interventionist foreign policy into the affairs of other nation states. It could be argued that this policy was beneficial because in 1971, the majority of countries voted in favour of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 2,758 (XXVI), which recognised the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the UN.
However, China did directly intervene in the affairs of other neighbouring countries only when there was a perceived threat to its sovereignty. Examples include direct intervention on the North Korean side in the Korean War of 1950-1953 and providing intelligence to North Vietnam in the Vietnam War of 1955-1975.
These actions were a result of China’s determination to limit the influence of foreign powers in its neighbourhood – a key factor that would determine China’s rise as a mediator in the 21st century.
After the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 (between America’s Nixon administration and Mao’s Government in China) followed by Beijing adopting the reform and opening up policy in 1978, China was on its path to becoming the factory of the world.
As China reaped financial benefits from these initiatives, it was vital for Beijing to develop and maintain strong economic links with many countries that invested and imported Chinese manufactured goods. This strong focus on economic development distanced China from being involved in geopolitical tensions beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
As the 21st century unfolded, and with China overtaking Japan as the second largest economy in the world in 2010 (during the presidency of Hu Jintao) followed by President Xi Jinping unveiling China’s monumental vision to resurrect the Silk Route via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) three years later, it was evident that China was on its path to becoming a prospective global power.
Therefore, in order to achieve this goal, it was a necessity for China to expand its footprint around the world. Nevertheless, for Beijing, it is paramount that China’s global image as a positive force in the world is not tarnished in the process.
Hence, it could be assessed that the relatively less negative historical baggage (associated with colonising countries) and being a vital country in the global value chain have benefitted China because its growing influence is both acknowledged and respected at the same time by many state and non-state actors. Therefore, such a global standing permits China to engage in the affairs of mediating international disputes, complimenting Beijing’s commitment to preserve the country’s image as a positive force in the world.
Early efforts at mediation
However, as revealed by political scientist Niklas Swanström (Executive Director at Sweden’s Institute for Security and Development Policy), mediation was an area in which the People’s Republic of China had a lack of knowledge and experience. Hence, before venturing into this space, China acted with caution.
As highlighted by Helena Legarda (Lead Analyst at Germany’s Mercator Institute for China Studies), China has engaged in low-key mediation in the Korean peninsula (since 2003) and in the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan (from 2008-2011). Although these mediation efforts did not result in successes, they were testing grounds for China to familiarise itself with the art of mediation and learn how to secure its interest while maintaining its public image in the process.
These harbinger efforts in China’s rise as a mediator may be elaborated further. Facilitating relations between the US (including its allies in the region, Japan and South Korea) and North Korea about the latter’s nuclear weapons programme placed China as a crucial stakeholder in this dispute. Hence, as noted by Swanström, China’s mediation has prevented North Korea from reaching out to Russia for security guarantees that would have undermined China’s status in the region.
With regard to Sudan and South Sudan, by intervening in the conflict, China has been able to secure its oil and mining contracts in both countries while maintaining amicable relations, despite prevailing diplomatic tensions between Sudan and South Sudan over oil revenue.
Recent successes
By the time the BRI was formally announced in 2013, China had been reasonably exposed to the art of mediation. Since peaceful and stable nation states and regions are vital to the BRI’s success, the need to resolve conflicts in various regions along the land and maritime routes soon became a necessity if China wished to realise the BRI. Therefore, the BRI could be argued as a reason for China’s rising status as a mediator.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, commonly referred to as the Iranian nuclear deal) could be argued as a notable commitment by China in a multilateral mediation effort.
Despite the US withdrawing from the agreement in 2018 (during the first Donald Trump administration), China together with Russia stood firmly with Iran. Regardless of the latter nation’s repudiation of conditions under the JCPOA subsequent to the US withdrawal, this resulted in Iran continuing cordial relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and not acting in isolation – an outcome that would have been detrimental to the stability of West Asia and ongoing BRI projects in the region.
Given how difficult it is for the two nuclear-armed South Asian countries to agree on being part of a regional security body, China played a crucial mediating role to admit both India and Pakistan as members to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2018.
As argued by Samuel Ramani (an Associate Fellow at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute), in spite of close ties with Islamabad, Beijing is aware that for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC, a land route which is part of the BRI) to bear fruit, it is essential to have New Delhi on its side because the proposed corridor cuts through the disputed region of Kashmir.
In 2022, Xi announced China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the Boao Forum held that year. The GSI is inspired by the concept of ‘indivisible security.’ This rejects the idea of isolating the national security of one country and emphasises that one country’s national security is linked to other countries. Therefore, mutual dependence on security is the best way forward to create peace and stability in the world.
With the GSI now being part of the Chinese Communist Party’s policy, China’s most recent successful mediation effort was restoring diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023. According to Amrita Jash (Assistant Professor at India’s Manipal Academy of Higher Education), this achievement by China is as significant as US-led mediation triumphs such as the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Abraham Accords of 2020.
Despite being the present-day superpower, it is unfortunate that the US was unable to amend relations between these two countries. It could be argued that this is primarily due to Washington’s interest in fostering tensions so that Saudi Arabia remains a market that imports American state-of-the-art weapons to defend its borders and immediate neighbourhood from Iran. On the other hand, China’s goal of enhancing international trade in general via the BRI makes inclusivity easier, hence its delivery of mediation efforts.
China’s formula
As stated by Center for China and Globalization Founder Wang Huiyao, China is able to leverage itself as a mediator due to its strong economic relations. China is the largest trading partner for India, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. This makes it relatively easier to project its soft power on disputing parties.
China’s ongoing efforts include mediating in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine as well as that between Israel and Palestine. Even among these countries, China emerges as one of their largest (or even the largest) trading partners.
In 2023, taking note of China’s rising status as a mediator, French President Emmanuel Macron urged Xi to convince President Vladimir Putin to end Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. According to Galia Lavi and Oded Eran (senior research personnel at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies), the US-Israel bond will be challenged if the people of West Asia (including the Israelis) begin to increasingly view China in a positive light on account of its infrastructure projects in the region.
As revealed by British academic Hugo Slim, unlike the US and its European allies, China does not impose liberal ideologies when mediating conflicts. What gives the Chinese Government leverage as a mediator is its deep understanding of the historic context of the dispute and its being able to respect and work with governments that have different ideologies.
As much as it seems that China is focusing on fostering trade via the BRI as means to resolve conflicts, Beijing is, in the process, also trying to gradually balance Washington’s influence. Moreover, with the US shifting its focus to domestic affairs, there is opportunity for China to fill the vacancy of a mediator. In the process, and in the words of Slim, China wishes to ‘de-occidentalise’ the approach to mediation.
According to Samir Bhattacharya (Associate Fellow at India’s Observer Research Foundation), China’s mediation follows a careful mix of three ‘I’s – interference, influence, and intervention – from which creative involvement is developed. The accompanying map depicts China’s past and current efforts at mediation in the world.
Challenges
Nevertheless, there are several factors that challenge China’s rising status as a mediator. They include China’s dispute over the South China Sea, its attempts to incorporate Taiwan into its sovereign territory, and its border disputes with India. As pointed out by the Brazilian journalist Fábio Galão, a major criticism about China’s mediation involves its lack of concern in holding conflicting parties accountable on human rights.
Traditionally, the country focuses strongly on working with state actors rather than with non-state actors such as civil society organisations. This could be the reason why human rights and other similar concerns take a back seat in the mediation agenda.
Moreover, as the 21st century unravels, mediation on topics such as climate change, migration, and tariffs seem to take centre stage along with geopolitical tensions. This would further complicate mediation efforts.
How well China navigates these issues and developments would depend on the Chinese Communist Party’s commitment to the GSI and its creative involvement in mediation.
(The writer is a researcher in international relations)
(Source: MERICS; taken from Helena Legarda’s article titled ‘China wades into the Israel-Palestine conflict once more’)