Naval assets are tools through which a country’s geopolitical standing is constantly being tested, especially in contested waters.

After Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel on 7 October, the United States (US) promptly dispatched two carrier battle groups to the Gulf and the Mediterranean. The purpose was to deter potential anti-Israeli elements rallying around to attack Israel.

Global powers constantly use their naval prowess to showcase their intentions by deploying their naval assets in various parts of the world. Most of the time, these naval assets will be used to meet specific national interests. Sri Lanka is no different: it has done the same in the past and will be doing the same in the future.

The Sri Lankan President Ranil Wickremesinghe stated that a decision has been taken to dispatch a Sri Lankan Naval vessel to Bab-el-Mandeb to protect international shipping lines from Houthi attacks.

While this statement should be taken with a pinch of salt, particularly with regard to how willing the political leadership would be to invest in these vessels via operational expenses, surveillance equipment, and supporting logistics at a time of dire economic crisis at home, this is at the same time a welcoming opportunity that the Navy should not miss.

SLN and national interest

The Sri Lanka Navy has executed its Naval deployments in meeting national interests on previous occasions as well. The then Royal Ceylon Navy was involved in transferring the tooth relic of the Buddha by ship to and from Myanmar in 1950.

From more recent times, the Navy embarked on a hallmark deployment in hunting down separatist terrorist floating warehouses from 2007 to 2008. Once the military will and political will synergised, a bold decision was taken to go after the centre of gravity of the separatist terrorists. The fleet of coastal freighters engaged in gunrunning and seeking refuge in high seas at ranges. The enemy felt, wrongly, that the Navy would not dare approach these seas.

Then later, with the looming drug menace, the Navy again went out to the high seas. This time, it ventured into the South of the Arabian Sea, in search of Iranian dhows that acted as the mother ships to transfer drugs to Sri Lankan fishing vessels.

Before that decision was taken in 2019, the Navy sought assistance from the Indian Navy and the Bahrain-based Combined Maritime Force (CMF) as the Navy concluded that the Arabian Sea was not an operational area for them. But, when both India and the CMF declined to provide assistance on the pretext of vessel unavailability, the Navy Headquarters decided to engage in the operation by itself. The rest is history, with arrests of several mother vessels and Sri Lankan fishing vessels engaged in the peddling of drugs.

In deploying naval assets, the primary factor to consider is simply–what for? What is the necessity? Is it in our national interest?

In the cases mentioned above, there was a clear national interest, particularly considering that the South Arabian Sea is an area of operational interests. At the same time, for separatist terrorism, the vast sea area towards the South and South-East, reaching up to the immediate periphery of the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone, was an area of interest.

The question to ask here is, would Bab-el-Mandeb Strait also constitute a national interest? This analysis intends to discuss that prospect against the need to balance the cost of operational expenses.

Purpose of being a “club member”

It would be good to take part in regional Naval affairs as these would enhance our credibility and gain us acceptance as a regional partner. However, do we have to go to great lengths to prove this? We need not, as our Navy is already performing a major role that has been appreciated in many Naval forums.

We have ensured that our maritime jurisdiction remains safe and secure and have collaborated with all search and rescue regions adjacent to us in coordinating maritime affairs. Further, we are already an active partner in securing the drug routes to Australia, the Maldives, and the Bay of Bengal region.

The major Navies would want to jump into these hotspots not to engage in fighting but to train their men and machinery. How much you learn by operating in these “hotspots” is known by these Navies and no simulation can possibly replace it. It is a matter of operating close to the hotspots but not within the hotspots.

In the mid-1980s, the US Navy learnt some hard lessons in their skirmishes in the Strait of Hormuz when they were challenged by Iranian small boats. The US tactics heavily depended on airpower (helicopters primarily) more than Naval power.

In such high tempo, intense, and dynamic conflicts, the machinery and the men behave very differently. In one of several instances, the US Service Vincennes shot down the Iranian Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988. The flight took off from Bandar Abbas and was mistakenly identified as a fast-approaching speedboat.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of that time, it was the moment of retaliation as Russians had been blamed for shooting down the Korean Airlines Flight 007 over the Sakhalin Islands on 1 September 1983. In just days, the US Navy deployment changed as Naval assets were withdrawn, and hostilities gradually died down in the Strait of Hormuz.

Are we ready for these kinds of situations? Are we ready to get involved in more international engagements and geostrategic pressures when we have run into a mess managing our own affairs?

History indicates that the purposes of these “extraordinary” decisions to reach out for global affairs are two-fold. On one hand, these are distractions from internal political issues and on the other hand, they are situations in which you can be both present and not present at the same time. In other words, they are convenient ways by which we can commit to something through words, but not through actions.

The President’s thought process in the media bulletin is a set of empty words, where the underlying thought may be brilliant but at the same time lacks a proper action plan or strategy. Had the President walked his talk, this island nation would not have been like this in the context of global competition dictated by maritime matters.

To operate in these tense waters, our offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) will need new installations in the form of thermal cameras and stabilised platforms, which we have not replaced since 2009. We would need better electronic warfare (EW) suits as not all our EW equipment is now operational.

On the weaponry front, the OPVs are still capable of effectively countering surface and drone threats. It is a matter of revitalising the old training techniques that we used to counter the aerial threats and potential missile attacks. Any drone or surface vessels that are approaching our own units can be brought under a tremendous “cone of fire”, thereby destroying them.

However, Houthis are sending missiles as well. The asymmetric nature of warfare has changed a lot in technological terms, so much so that the US Navy is competing with a non-State actor who uses commercial drones, anti-ship missiles, and small manned and unmanned surface vessels.

This is the ideal testing ground for India’s defence industry that has expanded exponentially in recent years, and there they are too. On the pretext of protecting Indian national interests, this is the time to test how combat effective the radars, sensors, surveillance instruments, and even the new combat helicopters are. These situations do not present in this format frequently, to be there.

Navy should not miss this moment

The President’s statement at a time of economic crisis in the island nation is an opportunity that the Navy should not miss. Since 2022, there has hardly been any capital investment in the armed forces let alone in the Navy. Despite boasting of a large defence budget, there were lesser than 30% of State capital expenditure spent on defence budgets. Thus, the Head of State’s “wishes” would need to be exploited to the hilt so as to obtain investments in today’s operational necessities.

The second reason why the Navy should not miss this opportunity is that it provides the Navy with a reason to operate in an oceanic area that has a direct bearing on our battle against drug peddling in the Arabian Sea. There is no regional or extra-regional Navy that is interested in intercepting drugs and narcotics in the Arabian Sea, which are bound for Sri Lanka.

Thus, it is time that we extend our “operational interest” to the Gulf of Yemen and the Arabian Sea (though perhaps not in the Northern part) whilst amalgamating our national interest in fighting the drug menace from the sea with the political interest of operating in partnership with other countries in the South of the Red Sea.

The only drawback is that Sri Lanka will be tagged as a “partner” for U.S.-led initiatives, thereby indirectly hinting at a possible association with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue camp at the expense of the China camp. The free media opinion makers will endorse these perspectives, possibly the Indian defence analysts more than our own political leaders.

By operating in the South of the Red Sea, what do we stand to get? After all, if the Government goes ahead and invests in absolutely required technological necessities, the Navy can reach out and operate in partnership with regional and extra-regional navies.

This belies another problem. Would Iran and the Gulf countries endorse our presence? The political thinking in the Gulf countries has changed a lot in the last five years and the global divisions that have resulted from the recent Israel-Gaza war are significant and cannot be simply forgotten. If these Gulf countries were totally in support of the US, we would have seen a Gulf coalition by now. But, do we see any?

There is a growing tide of global opinion, and this tide is against the US and Europe and not necessarily Sri Lanka. In that sense, we need not worry about burning our fingers yet. On the other hand, a country’s Naval assets cannot be the sacrificial lamb or the price for political miscalculations, a point that has much relevance, given that history is full of such costly blunders.

(The writer was the Chief of Staff and Chief Hydrographer of the Sri Lanka Navy and Joint Chief Hydrographer to the Sri Lankan Government. On retirement, his services have been secured by the United Nations as an International Consultant for Undersea Cables)

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication