The crash of a K-8 jet trainer aircraft of the Sri Lanka Air Force at Minuwangete in Wariyapola, during a routine exercise last Friday (21), has once again pushed the status of the equipment used by the Sri Lanka armed forces into the Public spotlight. 

Defence is an expensive affair. If you do not plan, prioritise and effectively manage fleets of ground, naval and air assets used by armed forces, it becomes costlier in the long run to sustain.

While the Air Force has officially stated that the procedural investigation into the crash and no announcement made about its progress, the Minister of Transport, Highways, Ports, and Civil Aviation Bimal Ratnayake last Sunday (23) opined that the aircraft did not suffer a mechanical error and claimed that according to a report he had seen the crash was a result due to pilot error. Why the minister, who is not the subject matter minister, was quick to disclose outcomes of what are normally lengthy investigations, is baffling.

However, with the spotlight back on the kit the armed forces use, the need for Sri Lanka to effectively prioritise and evolve their defence apparatus becomes more clear. The K-8, despite being ridiculed by some for being ‘Chinese-built’ has provided yeomen service in the SLAF over nearly two and half decades. A majority of SLAF jet pilots who remain in service today learnt ‘fast mover’ basics in the K-8 before they moved on to Kfirs, F-7s or MIG-27s. The K-8s also performed in the secondary ground attack role during the conflict and were also used in the air policing/interceptor role due to the lack of suitable aircraft during and after the conflict ended in 2009. K-8 trainers are also widely used in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt and other countries. Much of the SLAF’s fleet is ageing, if you were to only go by the year of manufacture. However, in the field of aviation, an aircraft’s age is judged more by the number of hours it has flown and how regularly it has been maintained and overhauled, rather than just how old the platform is. This is why aircraft like C-130 Hercules built in the 1960s and passenger jets like Boeing 737 and DC10s continue to serve in various roles.

The issue at hand is that the fleet of the SLAF has been dwindling in number of airworthy ones due to the State not providing adequate funding to maintain, overhaul and update the fleet to ensure combat readiness and sustainability over the years. This situation has not been effectively addressed by successive governments from the post-conflict era. One of the best examples are Russian-built Mi-17 helicopters of the Sri Lanka Air Force. A long-standing workhorse of the SLAF, and a multi-role aircraft by all accounts, nearly 20 Mi-17s in the SLAF fleet remain grounded due to the inability to get them overhauled by the respective OMEs (equipment manufacturers) or licensed entities. Today only a handful are in airworthy condition, while another three are deployed on a UN mission in Africa. In the 2009-2020 period, the lack of State funding to get them overhauled, and later following the full-blown conflict between Russia and Ukraine has also increased the challenges in getting the fleet airworthy again. It is learnt that tug-o-war between competing private companies who have agreements with licensed maintenance plants in eastern Europe has also contributed to stalling efforts to get the fleet overhauled and has driven up prices as competitors exploit market limitations to squeeze the state out of more taxpayer rupees for the task. It is learnt that some companies have even taken matters before courts to bar others from competing in tenders to overhaul the helicopters. Added to this, pressure from the United States regarding not dealing with Russian companies which are under sanctions, doesn’t help Sri Lanka to effectively sustain its fleet.

Similarly, the SLAF’s PT-6 trainer aircraft fleet is also said to be largely grounded due to technical issues, and lack of spare parts from China. Furthermore, it is learnt that the process of overhauling the aircraft's radial engines is taking an exhaustively long period to complete, impacting training schedules. A few years back, some senior SLAF officers were of the view that the entire PT-6 fleet ought to be replaced with a newer type of trainer like Bangladesh has done.

Here again, poor policy-making has cost Sri Lanka. Over the last decade, multiple efforts to establish a Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) with help from Russian helicopter manufacturers were never taken seriously or were scuttled. Had Sri Lanka invested in an MRO facility on the Island, it could have serviced not only the local Mi-17 fleet but that of friendly countries in the region, which would have earned revenue and improved the island’s aviation industry. But alas, government of the day decided to spend US dollars 50 million on overhauling and upgrading five Kfir fighter jets, than investing one-third of it in establishing an MRO for helicopters in Sri Lanka.