• The succession race for the Supreme Leader could instigate political instability within the hardliners, drawing a wedge within Iran's conservative political class

On 19 May, the Islamic Republic of Iran woke up to the news of the demise of the then President Ebrahim Raisi, along with his Minister of Foreign Affairs Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and six others, when their helicopter crashed near the village of Uzi, East Azerbaijan Province. Demonstrating Islamic Republic of Iran's resilience in this moment of crisis, the Supreme Leader Khamenei declared five days of national mourning, appointing Mohammad Mokhber, the then First Vice President in the Raisi’s Government, as interim President, with the nation going on polls for Presidential elections on 28 June. No matter how smooth the transitional phase appears, President Raisi's untimely death has drastically altered the Ayatollah’s succession plan, since the late hardliner cleric was widely accepted (by many in the hardline/conservative camp) as the next Ayatollah.

This is reflected from the intense tussle to secure power in the upcoming presidential election potentially driving a wedge within the Iranian conservative/hardline camp during the elections for the next Supreme Leader, with the potency to further shrink Iranian political system.

Potential infighting within the conservative camp?

President Raisi’s victory in the Presidential Elections of 2021 not only strengthened the position of conservative/hardliners camp in the Iranian political system but potentially sealed the fate of the reformists block (advocates of socio-political reforms within the political system of the Islamic Republic) by marginalising them within the political class. President Raisi’s victory not only shrunk the Iranian political class, but strengthened a tradition of sidelining voices of dissent (members of the political class not aligned with the vision of the Supreme Leader). 

But President Raisi’s sudden demise is not only a major setback to the succession plans of the Supreme Leader (who, according to one expert, was grooming him for his succession) instead drew a wedge within the political class resulting in greater cohesion within traditional conservatives while drawing a wedge between regime loyalists and hardliners within Iranian institutions. Tracing the Iranian presidential elections since the nomination of then President Ahmedinejad, authors argue, all elections before 2021 has reflected some essence of intra-conservatism but unlike 2021 elections, the upcoming presidential elections on 28 June will reflect much larger essence of intra-conservatism, a potential friction within the hardline/conservative camp.

Although, disqualifications of presidential candidates (during 2021 elections) by the Guardian Council may have led to a poor turnout, but proved beneficial for the Supreme Leader Khamenei to successfully to successfully consolidate power in the hands of hardliners in 2021. As reiterated above, the demise of President Raisi is not only a major setback to the Supreme Leader’s plan for succession but it has resulted in a political infighting between regime loyalists and traditional conservatives eyeing for the presidency, and the power to lead the nation in name of the Ayatollah.

To understand the aforementioned political infighting, the authors classify the conservatives’ camp into three categories: the traditional conservatives, the hardliners, and the regime loyalists.

Mapping the trajectory of recent Parliamentary Elections in Iran, hardliners had secured more victories over traditional conservatives, initiating internal tussle between the two sub camps even after the Supreme Leader Khamenei’s warning against division. The Supreme Leader Khamenei may warn against creating divisions within the conservative camps and maintain unity, to counter the rise of reformists, but according to one source, for the higher echelons in Tehran, loyalists of the Supreme Leader remains a preference. This is not only expected out of Raisi’s successor, loyalists of the Supreme Leader will be the choice for Khamenei's successor. The regime, post-Raisi may prioritise loyalist candidates over conservative or moderates/reformists with the intent to maintain continuity within the highest echelons. As discussed in the aforementioned argument, the Supreme Leader was grooming the Late President Raisi as the Khamenei's successor not because for his affiliation with the conservative camp, instead he was a loyalist, a cleric, commanding respect from the Supreme Leader himself, which will pose a grave challenge during the nomination for the Ayatollah’s successor.

During the author’s discussion with two Tehran-based political commentators, the name that has appeared frequently within political factions in the context of potential succession of the  current Ayatollah, is Mojtaba Khamenei, the second son of the current Supreme Leader. One expert describes him as a candidate that exercises great influence and the brain behind the current regime’s brutal suppression in the aftermath Mahsa Amini protest, with close ties to Hossein Taeb, the former head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Wing. Moreover, Mojtaba Khamenei retained control over IRGC's Basij, a paramilitary volunteer militia within IRGC, even without holding any official portfolio in the regime.

However, some experts refrain from putting much weight behind Mojtaba as the next Ayatollah. Succession will re-define the Iranian political system, with the potential to even restructure the Iranian political class. That said, according to one expert, the Supreme Leader Khamenei was heard (on one occasion) of not supporting his son for the succession. It remains unclear whether his decision emanates from Mujtaba’s understanding of key principles reflecting from the revolution and there is not enough evidence that even points towards Mojtaba as a serious contender in the race for succession, giving him greater influence from working behind the curtains. That said, the Supreme Leader may nominate his son with the interest of continuity of the family name and Mujtaba’s connection with the IRGC intelligence make him a preferred choice of the conservative camp. 

However, if the presidential race sparks division within the conservative camp, by the time elections for the succession of the Supreme is announced, the wedge would cost greater chaos, compromising the legitimacy of the regime with traditional conservatives calling an end to nepotistic succession. That said, the succession of the Ayatollah will not just reflect the mood of the conservative camp, but expectations from the political class and the Islamic republic itself.  It all rests on the next President’s ability to manage political ambitions and rivalries within the conservative block and contain public discontent while managing expectations during the period of transition, maintain cohesion between lower echelon leaders, the IRGC to the governing council themselves. The succession will not only test the regime’s resilience but also the cohesion within the conservatives, which the Ayatollah may maintained, for now. Will the succession revive widespread protests or bring political instability? It will be for the next President of the Islamic Republic and the current Supreme Leader to decide.  

Will the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps retain power?

The IRGC was founded to protect (and defend) the Islamic system from external/internal interference. As an institution tasked to protect national integrity and maintain internal security, the IRGC will mobilise in case of an untimely demise of the Supreme leader, even before the Iranian political system overwhelms with factions tussling for power. In their role to protect national integrity and maintain security, the IRGC could lay the foundation for a smooth transition of power. In case of an unrest, the IRGC will mobilise, irrespective of who comes to power. However, it remains unclear whether it will have a say in the nomination. The authors estimate that the election for the Supreme Leader will occur during Khamenei’s time, which means the IRGC will defend and protect his successor.  

(Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales. Kaunert is a Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, and Professor of Policing and Security at the University of South Wales)

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(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication)