Sri Lanka’s upcoming Presidential Election on 21 September has triggered immense curiosity in the country and the region. It involves a lot of first-times: it is the first election after the mass popular uprising ‘aragalaya’ and the economic crisis; it is for the first time that four heavyweights (out of 39 contestants) will be contesting in the election, and it is for the first time that the Tamil parties have come up with their candidate. Given the nature of the upcoming election, there is a lot of unpredictability. For India, which has seen a recent upswing in relations with Sri Lanka, there are a lot of potential challenges and it is bracing itself for any outcome and surprises.
2024 Election: a view from India
The Election will be the first of its kind following the political and economic turmoil in Sri Lanka that began in 2022. The crisis was triggered by structural economic issues like budget and trade deficit, piling debt, and the severe depletion of foreign reserves, which led to a shortage of essential commodities and hyperinflation. Long lines for food and rations, power shortages, high-electricity prices, together with politicians failing to deliver on their promises led to nationwide protests demanding a ‘new system’. While the movement was largely peaceful, violence, clashes, and arson were reported on multiple occasions. In its final days, the protestors stormed into the Presidential Palace, forcing President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to resign.
Watching from a distant place, policymakers in New Delhi were anxious about the brewing humanitarian, political, and economic crisis and its potential spillover. On par with its ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Security and Growth for all in the Region’ (SAGAR) vision, India soon offered assistance worth $ 4 billion. It offered loan deferrals, currency swaps, grants, a short-term loan facility, humanitarian relief, and multiple lines of credit to ensure the supply of essential commodities. The assistance was to bring stability to the island nation. Besides, it also promoted strategic investments in the country to counter the increasing Chinese presence and promote Sri Lanka’s economic recovery and growth. India also assisted the country with its International Monetary Fund (IMF) negotiations and was part of the Official Creditors Committee that restructured the debts and offered a moratorium on foreign debt repayments worth $ 5.6 billion till 2028.
While India has assisted Sri Lanka in stabilising its economy, there is uncertainty concerning its future political direction. Given that people have continued to call for a ‘systemic change’ and there are four major candidates – Delhi knows that the political pendulum could swing either way. As a result, all four major candidates – independent Ranil Wickremesinghe, the National People’s Power’s Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna’s Namal Rajapaksa, and the Samagi Jana Balawegaya’s Sajith Premadasa – have either recently visited or are planning to visit India, on the latter’s invitation. Indian External Affairs Minister (EAM) Dr. S. Jaishankar’s recent visit to Sri Lanka in June also saw meetings between him and political leaders across various party lines. With this non-partisan approach, India is bracing itself for challenges and surprises emanating from the electoral outcomes.
Fishermen & the 13A
A primary challenge could emerge from the 13th Amendment (13A) to the Constitution signed in 1987 as a part of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. The 13th Amendment calls for Sri Lanka to devolve central powers and pushes for federalism and the empowerment of the provinces. India sees its’ implementation as crucial to ensure justice, equality, and peace for the country and, by extension, to secure itself from any potential spillover of the conflict. However, mainstream leaders in Sri Lanka have hesitated on its full implementation, especially with land and Police powers, due to their fears of feeding into Tamil secessionism and a potential backlash from their Sinhala voter base. Even in the upcoming election, no major candidate apart from Premadasa has agreed on the complete implementation of the 13th Amendment. Wickremesinghe has proposed the 13th Amendment without the Police powers, and Dissanayake is committed to conducting Provincial Elections (last held in 2013) but has urged the introduction of a new Constitution. The split between the Tamil parties – the Tamil National Alliance and the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchchi – and their differences on the Presidential candidates is also likely to weaken the calls for the 13th Amendment. India will thus continue to work with the new Government to implement the 13th Amendment and find a lasting solution for the country.
Another crucial challenge for India is to find a solution to the fishermen’s issue. As Indian fishers continue to enter Sri Lankan waters, they are arrested and their vessels are being confiscated. Last year (in 2023), over 240 fishermen were arrested, and 35 trawlers were seized. However, these altercations have grown increasingly violent in recent days, as demonstrated by the death of a Sri Lankan Navy sailor and an Indian fisherman in recent weeks. Tamil Nadu fishermen had also recently boycotted the annual St. Anthony’s Church festival to protest against a Sri Lankan Court’s sentence against Indian fishermen – demonstrating increasing tensions between local communities. It is with this urgency that President Wickremesinghe is pushing for a ‘once and for all solution’ while India has reiterated to find a ‘permanent solution’. But, till that solution is explored, India expects the Sri Lankan Government to view the issue through a ‘humanitarian approach’. This expectation will continue to be in place, regardless of the electoral outcome.
Connectivity & domestic politics
There has been a significant push for connectivity and economic integration between India and Sri Lanka, post-economic crisis. In the port sector, India is helping with the West Container Terminal in the Colombo Port, the Kankesanthurai Port in Jaffna, and the Trincomalee Port. It is also assisting with the Jaffna Airport and managing the Hambantota Airport. In terms of energy cooperation, wind projects are being developed in Mannar and Pooneryn, a solar project is being developed in Sampur, and the oil refineries in Trincomalee are being upgraded. Similarly, discussions are held on an energy grid, a two-way petroleum pipeline, a land bridge, and the Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement (ETCA). Indian firms have also expressed interest in Sri Lankan public enterprises.
This push for connectivity from India is to help Sri Lanka recover from the economic crisis and counter the Chinese presence and influence. However, economic cooperation with India has often been subject to domestic politics and nationalist sentiments. With the Presidential Election fast approaching, the current opposition is criticising some Indian projects and is accusing the Government of selling assets to India. Some projects have already slowed down due to accusations of corruption, and contracts could be revoked if there is a change in the Government. There is a possibility that nationalist anti-Indian sentiments could be evoked in this process. This could pose a major challenge to India’s vision for connectivity, foreign investments, and economic integration.
On the other hand, the fresh dispute in the Afanasy Nikitin Seamount (ANS) is likely to pose a new challenge. Sri Lanka’s application to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2009 to extend its continental shelf to cobalt and ferro-manganese-rich ANS has paused India’s application to the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to explore the Mount for mining. India’s interest in the ANS fits well with its energy transition goals. In recent years, India has identified 30 critical minerals to help with its energy transition and is exploring critical minerals in Mongolia, Argentina, Chile, Australia, and the Carlsberg Ridge. Given its priority and interests, India would like to resolve the issue diplomatically at the earliest. It would expect to find a mutually beneficial solution with the new Government without amplifying the country’s nationalist and anti-Indian sentiments.
The China factor
Finally, regardless of who wins the election, India will continue to have apprehensions of increasing Chinese presence in the country. China’s economic influence has compelled Colombo to entertain its interests and activities. For instance, its foreign direct investments totaled up to $ 5 billion between 2005-2019, and loans increased from $ 0.45 billion to $ 12 billion between 2006 and 2019. Even today, out of the $ 10.5 billion owed to bilateral lenders, China is the highest lender with over $ 4.6 billion. This is besides its $ 2.1 billion in commercial debt. Given its economic dominance, China has and will continue to leverage its influence against India, including leasing ports in Sri Lanka, promoting infrastructure projects, docking spy ships and submarines, and attempting to weaponise the Indian Ocean region. On their part, Sri Lanka is also keen to tap into China’s economic potential to further economic growth and recovery. Good ties with China will also offer more agency to Sri Lanka and provide a better bargaining chip vis-a-vis India and the US. This structural reality is not likely to change with the election outcome.
India knows this reality well. It realises that China will continue to leverage its economic might and influence to make inroads in Sri Lanka, and Sri Lankan leaders will continue to leverage their ties with both countries to further their interests. It will thus continue engaging with the new Government and offer alternative development partnerships and projects by leveraging its geographical proximity and historical ties. Jaishankar’s statement: “China is a major economy. It will deploy resources. It will try and shape things in China's way. Why should we expect otherwise? But the answer to that is not to complain about what China is doing. The answer is, okay, you are doing it. Let me do better”, best explains Indian pragmatism towards the election and the incoming Government. Nonetheless, Delhi expects that its redlines are respected by the new administration - namely, limiting Chinese engagements in defence and security cooperation and its presence in the Tamil-dominated regions. This will, however, be a challenge given Chinese increasing assertiveness in the region.
As we approach the election, there is immense uncertainty regarding the outcome and its aftermath. Some of these could also pose fresh challenges to India on issues like the fishermen’s dispute, the 13th Amendment, connectivity projects, disputed territories, and Chinese inroads in the region. However, by engaging all the main stakeholders, India seems to be bracing itself for the election outcome and its potential shocks. It is only in the best interests of India to leverage this non-partisan approach and find a workable solution to its challenges, regardless of who comes to power.
(The writer is an Associate Fellow, Neighbourhood Studies, Observer Research Foundation, India)
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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication