Sri Lanka’s Tamils are dreaming if they think India will help create Tamil Eelam with 13th Amendment (13A) land and Police powers. It is time that Sri Lanka’s Tamils wake up to reality.
At the time of India’s independence, Tamil Nadu sought self-determination, Indian leaders refused, and subsequently even Bangladesh was given independence but not Tamil Nadu. Indian leaders squashed every movement in Tamil Nadu for separatism, culminating in the 16th Amendment in 1963 to prevent Tamil Nadu from seceding.
In spite of the presence of 72 million Tamils, not a word of Tamil is in the Indian National Anthem though Tamil is both a National and Official Language in India. When India denies 72 million Tamils’ self-determination in India, will India allow the self-determination of Tamils in Sri Lanka unless India can use the quest to annex Sri Lanka to India? Therefore, Tamils must realise that they are unlikely to have a ‘homeland’ in either Tamil Nadu or Sri Lanka.
Ironically, the West and the church are also using Tamils for their own agenda, but here too Tamils are unlikely to have what they deem their ‘homeland’. These realities should dawn on Tamils in both Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka as well as the Tamil diaspora. They are all being used as pawns in a greater game of politics. All they will be allowed to achieve is limited personal gains and lucrative lifestyles for those engaged in a futile quest and they know it too.
Both the Indo-Lanka Accord and 13A had no inputs from the Tamils or the LTTE. They were drafted by India for India’s advantage. A Tamil United Liberation Fund (TULF) letter to Rajiv Gandhi on 28 October 1987 shows how the 13A/Provincial Council system was conceptualised by India and not by Tamil politicians or the LTTE.
The text of the accord did not mention ‘devolution’ even in the exchange of letters between J.R. Jayewardene and Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi.
The merger of the north-east was not a request by Tamils or LTTE but a geopolitical design of India in 1984. Even the Norwegian-brokered 2002 Cease Fire Agreement would not have been signed if not for the nod of approval by India.
The LTTE emerged the more powerful of the militants that India trained while India did not blink an eye to order the assassination of Prabhakaran. At the same time, India even saved Prabhakaran from being captured, primarily because India needed him to wrest more control over Sri Lanka for India, diplomatically. This was why Prabhakaran was whisked off to Delhi, but kept there till the accord was signed and PM Rajiv returned. Unfortunately, Prabhakaran did not like the treatment given and just four years later former PM Rajiv was assassinated.
The quest for separatism may have been promoted in Sri Lanka since 1949, but it would have not got anywhere without India’s tacit approval. Sri Lankan Tamils and the LTTE diaspora must realise that separatism or Eelam will be allowed only so far as it suits India’s advantage and is administered by India.
India, which took constitutional measures to prevent separatist quests in India, could have easily taken action to eliminate the LTTE after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Why didn’t India do so?
While the demise of a PM was a dent to India, it was too premature to eliminate the LTTE as India had bigger plans for Sri Lanka, not Tamils. That order eventually came on 15 September 1987 to Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) Commander Dixit to eliminate Prabhakaran. The decision came as a result of India preparing another armed group to take over Prabhakaran/LTTE and to come under India-propped and merged North Eastern Provincial Council Chief Minister Varatharaja Perumal.
Note how every decision and action was from India. It was on 8 October 1987 that IPKF declared war on the LTTE. Eventually, India sacrificed over 1,000 of its soldiers who were killed by the LTTE.
The Indo-Lanka Accord was factually incorrect and if Tamil politicians and the LTTE did not have any say in its drafting, we can only conclude that the insertion of “historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil-speaking people” was a ruse to merge the north-east simply because India’s eye was on Trincomalee Harbour and the Trincomalee oil tanks in the east.
Both the harbour and the oil tanks had nothing to do with the conflict nor were they even part of the LTTE’s demands. This was a strategic asset India wanted to acquire using its ‘we are for Tamils’ song.
The inclusion of ‘Tamil-speaking people’ was another ruse to get Muslims to agree following an agreement signed in Madras that Muslims could continue to live in the north. It would be interesting to see if India had manipulated the LTTE to chase the Sinhalese and Muslims out of the north as well.
It is noteworthy that Tamils were known as Malabars and the term Ceylon Tamils was coined in 1911, which became Sri Lankan Tamils in 1972. All that Tamils got from India was Official Language status with the Indo-Lanka Accord and the 13th Amendment.
In the exchange of letters, the Indian PM made five demands. These letters are not binding, because they were not annexed to the accord and so are not part of the accord, but it clearly shows that not a word was mentioned about Tamils. The demands were:
- To ensure territories of both India and Sri Lanka are not used for activities prejudicial to each other’s unity, territorial integrity, and security – nothing to do with Tamils
- To ensure no foreign military/intel personnel were prejudicial to Indo-Lanka relations – nothing to do with Tamils
- Trincomalee or any other port in Sri Lanka not to be made available for any military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests (while India was anti-US in 1990s, no US port or VOA could be set up, but now that India is friends with the US, Sri Lanka has to allow any US ship to land in Sri Lanka) – nothing to do with Tamils
- Joint venture to operate Trincomalee oil tanks – nothing to do with Tamils
- Sri Lanka’s agreements with foreign broadcasting organisations to be reviewed by India – nothing to do with Tamils
Indian envoys may be flying in and out of Sri Lanka, but we can be certain that discussions are not to please or be of advantage to Tamils, Tamil political parties, or the LTTE diaspora. The LTTE diaspora may be able to fool foreign governments, but it has no chance with India.
Sampanthan and Wigneswaran may be disappointed that Sumanthiran, tied to the West/church, may have other surprises to shock India.
Sri Lanka and even India must take stock of new developments – the West’s honeymoon with Modi is slowly coming to an end, which means Tamils are unlikely to get anything, and this is a clue for Sri Lanka to play its cards right.