Projections made by entities like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) predict marine vessel traffic, especially maritime freight transport, will grow at a compound annual growth rate of 3.6% through to 2050. They also predict that air cargo will see the most rapid growth by mode, and all transport lanes will face major challenges. As such, the sea lanes that ply the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and traverse Sri Lanka’s littorals will see a threefold increase by 2050. The writing is on the wall for those who know to read the numbers, that governance of the oceans around us, particularly for island nations like ours.
The IOR will need to prepare to face such eventualities while also dealing with the rise of the blue economy and the rise of both legal and illegal maritime activities. Furthermore, the region is witnessing increased geopolitical contestation, disruption by natural and non-state actors, and legal disputes on border issues. Facing these challenges will stretch thin individual States’ ability for governance and enforcement capabilities at sea. As such, the fragile security landscape which the IOR enjoys at present will not be sustainable with a better regionally coordinated and inclusive response.
These challenges are not limited to the IOR. It has been observed that the global maritime security architecture lacks a suitable single top-level structure, such as at the United Nations level, to look at the entire domain as a whole. Similarly, in the IOR, there is no singular mechanism that can set and implement a regional agenda for the Indian Ocean. While the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) could have been a platform which could have been developed to that end, and despite Sri Lanka’s keen interest in expanding the IORA’s focus to include a regional framework on responding to crises or enforcement, not much progress has been made. This, despite Sri Lanka holding the Chairpersonship of the IORA recently.
The increasing presence and activity of Chinese State-affiliated research vessels, warships and large tuna fishing fleets in the Indian Ocean also compounds the future of governance in the IOR. China has constantly undermined international law in the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. As such, it lacks credibility as a genuine State actor whose seemingly peaceful and benign activities in the IOR draw suspicion and concern from others who wish to play by the international rule book. Another evolving challenge is the rapid proliferation of autonomous and unmanned vessels or robotic systems that are increasingly plying the waters of the IOR. Most countries and regional architecture have not evolved their legal frameworks to deal with such systems. Further, with the ongoing technological revolution, States can now have near continuous or near ‘real-time’ satellite-based maritime domain awareness (MDA) systems. While these innovations enhance monitoring and enforcement, they come with challenges. Most littoral countries struggle to make sense of the limited data they collect through land-based sensors and are hesitant to share this limited data with others due to national security concerns and mistrust. The obvious use of the same technology by those involved in illegal activities will likely happen in the future.
In the IOR, nation States may need a paradigm shift in the way they view the region to effectively come together to better govern and enforce laws in the oceans. Irrespective of the many geopolitical divides, nations in the IOR can collaborate on the least common denominator, such as maritime safety, disaster relief and livelihood for coastal communities. Some efforts in this direction have already been taken. There have also been robust efforts, at times with extra-regional assistance, to help improve capacities of the small littoral nations of the IOR to respond to incidents at sea. It is clear that trust-building is more important than capacity-building for the region. Just as international legal frameworks evolved to combat Somali piracy, similar efforts are needed to evolve comprehensive legal frameworks for countering drug trafficking, illegal fishing, and cyber threats in the IOR. Since these issues are transnational, the United Nations and its relevant agencies would have to play a key role as well.
As such, looking ahead, maritime security in the Indian Ocean stands at a crossroads. If States fail to act collectively, maritime crime will increase, endangering regional stability and compounding maritime governance.