With another Easter Sunday coming to a close, many in Sri Lanka remain unconvinced about the origins and outcomes of the deadly 2019 attack. The attack jolted the citizenry back to the realisation that the end of the conflict in 2009 doesn’t necessarily mean the focus on security can end, and that the risk of terrorism remains constant. It also highlighted many gaps and shortcomings of Sri Lanka’s security apparatus and in the culture of how the island was governed.

Intelligence services play a vital role in providing governments with credible information about possible threats to the State and its population. A State's intelligence apparatus, commonly known today as the ‘intelligence community’, is tasked with making sense of complex issues and calling attention to emerging problems, threats to national interests, and acting on risks to the State and public. The role and task of intelligence is linked to all forms of governance since the beginning of recorded history, and continues to evolve, helping actors in the international arena and nations maintain order, stability and security, internally, regionally and globally.

For millennia, intelligence has often been a thankless job; often successes of their actions are undisclosed to the public, so as not to cause panic. However, almost every failure becomes a nationally known incident, which bureaucrats and senior government figures often wash their hands of any responsibility. Nevertheless, intelligence services are a vital and instrumental part of statecraft and governance. This is especially true for a small littoral State like Sri Lanka, which depends largely on diplomacy and intelligence to survive in the new world order.

Over the last three decades, the role and use of State intelligence services in Sri Lanka have been a hotly debated topic, with many views and opinions held on the issue. Like in many other nations, democratic or otherwise, the public has a ‘love-hate’ relationship with intelligence agencies. While movies and books may romanticise intelligence, or ‘spies’ in common parlance, the reality of the intelligence community is not a rosy one. More often than not, the role and employment of intelligence is misunderstood, abused or bungled by those within the community and those whom they answer to. Sri Lanka is no exception. Despite being a long-standing democracy, Sri Lanka has not always been able to effectively frame its intelligence apparatus within the expected boundaries of the constitution and democratic norms. Sri Lanka doesn’t stand alone in this challenge, with many other nations failing to do so during different periods of their history.  

Today, the Sri Lankan intelligence community, ‘warts and all,’ is again under the spotlight of public scrutiny. One may argue that it is so because there has been little oversight and accountability of the powerful intelligence apparatus of the island over the last few decades. Like any organisation, the intelligence community, if left unchecked and not held accountable, rots from within. This has been the experience of many nations, be they global powers or small States like Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has had its share of intelligence successes, failures, neglect and rogue actors, all contributing to the diverse tapestry of opinions which have formed about the ‘agents of the State’ since independence. One must note that Sri Lanka’s intelligence apparatus has functioned without the vital component for nearly 76 years; a national security policy. ‘National security’, a much-abused word in Sri Lankan politics, is often defined by who is in power, which is a grave mistake. Sri Lanka desperately needs a national security policy, which is crafted with as much bipartisan support as possible, and is crafted by experts based on a thorough medium-to long-term assessment of national interest and the evolving threat landscape. Such a policy, or at least a concise version of it should also be presented as a published white paper or an official document to ensure the regions and other nation states understand where Sri Lanka stands on national security. As such, the intelligence community of Sri Lanka was not able to frame its role and task, nor its operational parameters, based on national policy. This has led to ad-hoc guidance and policy changes from one government to another. It has also made the Sri Lankan intelligence apparatus weak and vulnerable to politicisation and exploitation. Further complicating matters is an institutionalised thought pattern that Sri Lanka is a ‘small State’ and can do nothing, or should do nothing, about foreign influence and intelligence activity on home soil. Taking stock of what is transpiring, it is evident that Sri Lanka needs to review and recalibrate its intelligence apparatus. While some in the intelligence community reject the idea, Sri Lanka needs to urgently formulate a legislative framework for its intelligence community with oversight. The intelligence agencies need to be accountable to the State and the law, as any other State  institution.