• People based governance with a rationalised political administration structure

Our simple voters, as the main stakeholders of any election, keep midnight vigil on any national election day, firstly wanting to know the winning party and the number of seats that they have won, and secondly, looking for the names and credentials of those who will represent them in the supreme Parliament in the case of a General Election. Hitherto, they were not keen to know how the number of seats were calculated, but, accepted the results without any fuss.

The pre-1978 Westminster first past the post (FPTP) system was of course easier to understand as the candidate who collected the highest number of votes in an electorate (the one who first passes the winning post) became the Parliamentarian for the electorate. However, in the present context, a few concerned voters noted from the puzzling results of the 1970 and 1977 General Elections that the FPTP system reveals a blatant mockery of the most fundamental “equality of vote” particularly in a country marred by ethnic strife.

Also, most voters have since realised that the “main wish” of the FPTP proponents to have a MP in the electorate to resolve their issues and grievances at the national Parliament level, has become outdated and redundant after the strengthening of the “decentralised political administration system” through the Provincial Councils (PCs) reinforced by the nine Provincial Parliaments in 1988, the rapid advances in the communication media through the television, Internet, electronic mail, WhatsApp, frequency modulation channels, etc., and the improvement of the transport network with private buses and long distance highways since the 1990s that effectively miniaturised our small country. 

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the PCs was paralysed by the MPs who jealously guarded their “preference/preferential vote” bank in the electorates and Districts, by using their decentralised budget while blocking the due powers to the PCs. However, at present, on average, there are 57 (PCs and Local Government [LG] levels) politicians for each electorate. Also, the colossal burdens that the people had to bear due to the shortsighted dictatorial decisions of those two regimes commanding super majorities under the FPTP system are not at all in its favour. Thus, the FPTP system is simply untenable, more so in view of its inability to ensure the most fundamental “equality of vote” that will surely foster unity and “Sri Lankan-ness” in a society afflicted by ethnic rifts.

The original proportional/proportionate representation (PR) system of 1978, basically attempted to give value to the valid votes to a much greater extent than the FPTP system, to meet the primary objective of rational seat allocation based on the “equal value” of the vote. However, it was also constrained by the inherent power hunger of the selfish politicians harping on the need to have so called “stable governments” with big majorities. As a result, the calculation of seat allocations became tricky for simple voters. Even if they were keen to check its veracity, they would have given up halfway, unable to digest complex factors such as the “relevant number of the votes” and the “resulting number” or the “constructive figure”, etc., as stated in the 1978 Constitution. Thus, it is now evident that the PR system that was in operation since the 1989 General Election where the “equal value” of the vote and meritocracy were envisaged, did not meet voter expectations due to the following impediments: i) the creation of a so called District “bonus” seat to each District winner, piggybacking on the valid votes of all the other parties in the District, to justify a so called “stable Government”, ii) the District-wise minimum requirement of votes (since reduced from 12.5% to 5%), discarding large chunks of valid votes to the “wastepaper basket” to favour major parties, iii) the predetermined allocation of seats at the District level when the seats should have been proportionately determined at the national level for the single Parliament at the Centre; and iv) the replacement of “District priority and merit lists” by the infamous “preference cum ‘manapey (preferential)’ vote” mechanism with nomination lists in an alphabetical order, allowing the nomination of “henchmen” of party leaders to strengthen their “vote bank”. 

This measure also crippled the avowed objective of making the much larger District as the polling unit to discourage the 196 District MPs from spending their valuable time for vote canvassing efforts such as issuing MPs’ chits, distributing goodies, attending local opening ceremonies, funerals, weddings, birthdays, etc., at the electorate level. Obviously, the more ubiquitous Provincial Councillors should have been handling such matters. The MPs were expected to spend more time to achieve Parliament related objectives viz. law making, controlling national finance, approving and monitoring national and decentralised budgets, and making foreign and local policy from the Centre. In any case, even the present system would not prevent parties from assigning electorates to their MPs as it is a party matter.

The differences resulting from the aforesaid “tinkering” of the clean PR concept and the extrapolated electorate level press results under the pre-1978 FPTP method can be seen from the analysis of the 2020 General Election results.

In other words, if 100% PR arithmetic ensuring  “equal value” for the votes was adopted at the 2020 Election, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna would have won only 133 seats which is below a two thirds majority. The Jathika Jana Balawegaya (National People’s Power) would have increased its seats from three to nine while the United National Party would have got five seats instead of one. The Our Power of People Party would get a fair increase from one to two seats. The Ilankai/Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi/Kadchi would see a reduction from 10 to seven seats while the Eelam People’s Democratic Party sees a justifiable reduction from two to one seat. However, five new parties and/or independent groups would have entered the Parliament with one seat each, giving maximum value to the valid votes. The fundamental and inherent weakness of the FPTP system revealing the blatant disparities arising from the “inequality” of votes is highlighted and affirmed.

In 2018, the mixed member voting (MMV) system, to appease the so called FPTP camp demanding a MP to look after each electorate was tested with the island-wide LG Election. As we know, the alien MMV system with ad-hoc ratios, ended up with a heap of “overhang” problems. However, in the present context, any attempt to recognise the outdated FPTP system through a “mixed member electoral system” would be an exercise in futility and redundant for the voters, the authorities and the country.

In hindsight, with the advent of PCs in 1988, the authorities  should have firstly introduced a simple and fair electoral system based on the “equal ballot” as per Article 93 of our Constitution and the  more precise Article 21(3) of the United Nations’ “Universal Declaration of Human Rights -1948” which reads as - “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the Government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”

Secondly, the authorities should have kept abreast with the changing times and introduced a mandatory mechanism to ensure the nomination of 225 “country first political professionals” to represent the increasing numbers of the new generation and youth by repealing the corrupt and abhorrent “preference vote (manapey)” option. Due to their failure to do so, the achievement of the said secondary concern of the voters has been doomed from the inception of our electoral system.

(The writer is a former Deputy General Manager of the Bank of Ceylon)

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication.