- Will, diplomacy, and the limits of external pressure
M.R. Narayan Swamy’s recent review of former Air Force Chief Oliver Ranasinghe’s book ‘To Survive as One Nation, One People’ poses a question Sri Lanka has never fully resolved. Can the country become a genuine single nation and single people while minorities continue to be viewed with residual suspicion?
The review challenges a narrow majoritarian reading of history that minimises Tamil grievances, attributes militancy primarily to external inducement, and treats devolution as a slippery slope to disintegration.
Yet the problem extends beyond any single narrative. From time to time Tamils, Muslims, and Christians find themselves collectively placed under a cloud, whether over Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) commemorations, delayed provincial elections, religious dress and practices, residual extremism narratives, or the contested handling of the Easter Sunday investigations. These episodes emerge from a mixture of historical default, political design, and the pressures of domestic, regional, and global geopolitics.
The decisive question now is how the incumbent National People’s Power (NPP) Government under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake approaches this reality. Does it possess the political will to confront the culture of suspicion and build authentic national unity, or is it engaged primarily in careful diplomacy, consensus language, and reactive management of pressures?
NPP’s strategic ambiguity
On the surface the Government’s language marks a clear departure from earlier majoritarian formulations. President Dissanayake has repeatedly declared that racism in any form will not be allowed or tolerated; that the motherland belongs equally to Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims, Malays, and Burghers; and that the politics of division must yield to the politics of unity.
Meetings have been held with Tamil and Muslim parties. Assurances have been given on the return of civilian lands in the north. Development and housing programmes targeting war-affected families have been highlighted. Investigations into the Easter Sunday attacks have been reinvigorated and have reached into the intelligence architecture in ways previous administrations largely avoided.
These steps improve the atmosphere and signal a deliberate attempt to reposition the governing coalition beyond the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna’s (JVP) historical association with Sinhalese nationalist positions.
Yet rhetoric and selective practical measures must be tested against structural performance. The most visible test remains the long-delayed Provincial Council Elections. Despite earlier commitments, the polls remain in abeyance.
The language of ‘national consensus,’ parliamentary select committees, and the need for broad dialogue before constitutional reform is interpreted by minority parties and many observers as strategic ambiguity, an effort to avoid decisions that could unsettle the NPP’s core Sinhala Buddhist support base while still managing external expectations. The parallel insistence on a unitary state framework alongside talk of a new constitution reinforces the perception that meaningful power-sharing is being treated as secondary or indefinitely negotiable.
India’s dual messaging
It is precisely at this point that the recent visit of Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri becomes instructive. On 5 August, Misri publicly urged the Sri Lankan leadership to hold the Provincial Council Elections “at the earliest” and to fully implement constitutional provisions to meet the aspirations of the Tamil people.
The call was consistent with India’s long-standing position that the 13th Amendment and provincial governance form a non-negotiable component of regional stability. In meetings with Tamil political leaders, however, a more cautious private message was reportedly conveyed. India stressed equality for all Sri Lankan citizens and indicated a clear red line around minority aspirations that would amount to arrangements benefiting only one community.
Federalism and concepts of internal self-determination, long advanced by sections of Tamil politics and the diaspora, found no encouragement. Political observers detected a pragmatic shift: New Delhi prioritising overall stability and the preservation of Sri Lanka’s unitary constitutional structure over maximalist federal demands, recognising that federalism has little traction among the Sinhalese majority and that pushing it risks destabilising the south, outcomes that would not serve India’s own security interests.
This dual messaging is significant. India continues to press Colombo on the democratic deficit created by the indefinite postponement of provincial elections and on the need to address Tamil political aspirations within the existing constitutional framework.
At the same time, it has signalled to Tamil politicians the limits of what external support can realistically deliver. Maximalist federalist thinking that ignores the political arithmetic of the island and the security anxieties of the majority is unlikely to receive Indian backing.
The message is clear: provincial elections and the operationalisation of existing devolution arrangements are legitimate and necessary; federalism as a political project is not on the table.
For the NPP Government, this external posture both creates pressure and provides political cover. The public Indian call for early elections keeps the issue alive and makes indefinite delay more costly. The private caution against federalism reduces the risk that Colombo will be pushed into concessions that its southern base would reject.
The result is a space in which the Government can continue to emphasise dialogue, consensus, and incrementalism without immediate rupture. Whether this constitutes genuine will or skilled diplomacy and marking of time is the open question.
Govt.’s predicament
A government with full political will would treat the holding of Provincial Council Elections as a democratic priority rather than a matter deferred pending perfect consensus. It would ensure that law enforcement on commemorations, religious expression, and residual security threats is visibly even-handed.
It would further accelerate transparent processes on land, mass graves, and the full truth of Easter Sunday without selective narratives. And it would invest sustained political capital in inter-community trust-building rather than relying primarily on high-level meetings and carefully calibrated statements.
The present administration has correctly identified the toxicity of racist politics and has articulated a vision of equal belonging. It has taken certain practical steps that improve the climate. It operates, however, under real constraints: economic pressures, the need to manage its core electoral base, the historical baggage of its main constituent party, and the complex interplay of Indian interests.
In this environment, the preference for prolonged dialogue and reactive management is understandable as risk management. It is less convincing as a strategy for dismantling the deeper culture of mutual suspicion.
From aspiration to lived reality
India’s recent diplomacy underscores both the possibilities and the limits of external influence.
Colombo has been reminded that the democratic and constitutional deficit of empty Provincial Councils cannot be indefinitely ignored. Tamil political actors have been reminded that maximalist federalist demands that ignore the island’s political realities and India’s security calculations will not find traction in New Delhi.
The space that remains is for pragmatic, realistic progress within a unitary framework, progress that requires proactive political courage from the Sri Lankan Government rather than prolonged diplomacy and incremental containment.
True ‘one nation, one people’ cannot be achieved while minorities are periodically treated as objects of residual doubt, nor can it be imposed by external pressure alone. It requires a government willing to convert rhetorical commitment into structural change and a political culture prepared to accept equal citizenship as strength rather than concession.
The present administration has opened a door. Whether it walks through it, or continues to manage the threshold with careful diplomacy, will determine whether the ideal remains an aspiration or becomes a lived reality.
(This analysis is offered in the interest of national security, institutional reform, and public safety)
(The writer is a security analyst, a retired Senior Superintendent of Police, a former Head of the Counter-Terrorism Division of the State Intelligence Service, a former Director of the Police Special Branch, a former First Secretary [Defence] at the Sri Lankan Embassy in Thailand, a former Investigation Consultant of the Sri Lanka Police Financial Crimes Investigation Division, and the Managing Director of Smart Security Solutions Ltd.)
(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this publication)
Graphic text:
One nation, one people
Unity in diversity – Justice for all – Future together
- Sri Lankan Government
- Hold Provincial Council Elections
- Equal law enforcement
- Inclusive constitutional dialogue
- Transparent accountability
- Majority community
- Reject suspicion of minorities
- Embrace equal citizenship
- Support inter-community trust
- Tamil political leaders and community
- Realistic aspirations within unitary state
- Reject residual separatism
- Engage constructively
- Muslim and Christian communities
- Combat internal extremism
- Seek truth without polarisation
- Build interfaith bridges
- India (external partner)
- Support stability and 13th Amendment implementation
- Encourage pragmatic devolution
- Discourage maximalist federalism
- Civil society, religious leader, and media
- Promote harmony education
- Counter divisive narratives
- Foster everyday coexistence