It has been almost two weeks since the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's slain secretary-general, and the beginning of what many experts opine is Israel’s third war with Lebanon.
As the conflict completes one year, it is safe to say that the Lebanese have become accustomed to becoming collateral between Hezbollah/Hamas and Israeli firefights, with one expert defining the Lebanese experience as ‘tolerant with sheer ability to absorb violent shocks’, which appear to escalate this time. That said, it is without a doubt Hezbollah’s current leadership – irrespective of whether Israelis were able to kill Hashem Safieddine successfully – appears to manage the battle.
This is evident from the current picture authors could make, considering the limited data from the battlefield and the interviews of Lebanese nationals directly affected by it. According to one former Hezbollah commander currently based in Beirut, the group appears to have regained tactical control, with the resumption of its rocket launches and deterring any Israeli incursion along the southern border. According to him, this indicates that Hezbollah's command and control (at least at the tactical level) appears to have stabilised. This could mean, Hezbollah taking the time to ponder on the bigger picture, making strategic decisions to consolidate its position and even perhaps strengthen in the Middle East.
In deciphering the latest speech by Naim Qassem Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General (after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah) referred to Hezbollah’s command and control to function in the same operational capacity with no change in the organisational or leadership architecture while indirectly mentioning the group’s plan to evolve, perhaps tactically. Although his speech was devoid of any significant update on the critical loss of its Tier-1 hierarchy, instead, his speech reflected a re-affirmation of Hezbollah’s broader ideology, one that involves confronting Israeli Defence Forces tactically in Lebanon, defending the integrity of Gaza, and responding to any assassination attempts by Israel.
Tehran’s perspective on Nasrallah’s death
For Tehran, the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah is not interpreted from the perspective of ‘just another killing of a senior political leader of its proxy group’. According to one senior Iranian political leader, Tehran views it as joint efforts undertaken by Israel and the US to potentially strangle Iran by neutralising/dismantling its proxy groups, striking them one by one, targeting its leadership and then using all available resources to annihilate Iran. On this, one Iranian scholar opines Tel Aviv and Washington have been inseparable, combining the efforts to target Iran. On further enquiring the basis of this argument, the scholar pointed towards a statement made by Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant who reflected Israel’s fight against an Iranian Octopus with its head sitting in Tehran and its tentacles targeting them. Nasrallah’s death, the authors opine, is not only a significant blow to Hezbollah’s morale but potentially puts Tehran in Israel’s crosshairs.
Taking note of Israel’s war against Hamas/Hezbollah since October 2023, the trajectory has elevated to unstable deterrence. It appears to be strengthening, perhaps even tightening the noose tactically (around Iranian proxies), which would further tighten if Iran or any of its ‘Axis of Resistance’ reflect signs of weakness, strategically or on the battlefield.
Are Iranian nuclear sites at stake?
It will not be incorrect to state that, today, regional insecurity has elevated to the point that even in Tehran, political leadership has expressed their concerns about the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites. It appears that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may strike inside Iran, and any weakness displayed by Hezbollah or Hamas on the battlefield could elevate his confidence in making this decision, which experts once opined as ‘impossible’. Hypothesising Israeli decision-making and probing Iranian deterrence, is an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites probable?
The Islamic Republic of Iran faces one of the most significant challenges: the threat to its regime’s survival. This could potentially force Tehran to declare an all-out war against Israel if Tel Aviv decides to attack the ‘head of octopus’ by targeting Iranian nuclear sites, which has the potency to become a reality if Tehran continues to reflect tactical constraint, not in the battlefield of Lebanon but against Israeli intelligence attempts to assassinate its Tier-1 leadership inside Iran or in the Middle East. If Tehran continues to lose all critical leadership of its Axis’ (at this rate, it is highly likely), the Israeli decision under such a scenario would be to strike inside a completely exposed (flanked) Tehran, which it would then be forced to fight a losing battle. The authors opine that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already taken steps in this playbook, one which reflects his direct address to the people of Iran (made on 30 September), potentially inciting them against the Ayatollah, promising a brighter future if Iran’s Axis’ collapse.
Noting the trajectory of Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisions since October 2023, the authors opine Tel Aviv has gradually stepped up its game, which appears to have further escalated in the last few weeks. Every time Israeli action results in the death/assassination of a Tier-1/Tier-2 politico-military leadership of the Iranian Axis’, there appears to be no retaliation against such attacks. Taking Israeli actions into account, one may argue that the Israeli Prime Minister seems to take this war to Iran, targeting roughly all nationals within the Iranian proxy groups (Lebanese, Palestinians, Yemenis) and numerically killing more Hamas/Hezbollah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders than his predecessors, none of which has been countered/deterred in any form by Tehran. An absence of a tactical response from Tehran reflects not just signs of weakness but also potentially encourages Tel Aviv to strike more. To this, one Tehran-based scholar argues, how many Israeli attacks would justify an Iranian response?
That said, in the case of Tehran, the cost is much higher in maintaining a tactical restraint than possible retaliation – as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu begins to display his resolve to eradicate Iranian proxies, but in actions – exaggerating Iranian resolve and calls for unification of Muslim world against Israel reflect frustration, even proving counterproductive in the context of psychological warfare, further damaging morale of Axis’ fighters in Lebanon.
A strategic quagmire?
With the death of Nasrallah, the master of narratives and potential curator of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ – a cleric whose words echoed in the minds of not just Lebanese but also Iraqis and Syrians – words without actions will prove seriously counter-productive, potentially threatening Iranian regional/national security, one which experts once opined ‘unthinkable’.
According to the authors, Tehran's challenge does not emanate from the battlefields of Lebanon or the trenches of Gaza. It also remains to be seen whether the US presidential elections in November would alter the current Israeli resolve. As for Iran, in terms of Washington’s proximity with Israel, the incoming presidential elections may not make the desired impact: slow down Israel’s resolve to retaliate against Iran.
Iran’s biggest adversary (at this time) is not Israel or the sheer cohesion between Washington and Tel Aviv but its strategic patience. Tehran appears to preserve its resources for a battle that may not come at a time or a place of its choosing. It seems to have misunderstood the winds of change in Tel Aviv’s strategic posture since the allies (Tel Aviv in consensus with Washington) appear to have decided to go all the way, dismantling the sheer actors that are vital pillars in its strategic decision-making, which may not be available when the war comes to its shores.
(Mishra is a visiting fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales. Dr. Kaunert is Professor of International Security at Dublin City University, and Professor of Policing and Security at the University of South Wales)
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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of this publication